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STATEMENT OF SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD (D. , MONTANA)

.

THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY

Mr. President:
Let me preface my remarks with this assurance to the Senate.
not an alarmist.

I am

I measure the words I am about to speak most carefully

In

that context , I express to the Senate my belief that just ahead lies the most
critical period which the United States will have had to face since the conflict
in Korea.

It is a

pe~-w~h-me.f-w&J..-1.

wr1d m1 ss_.a-devestat1og war--by a-¥eryW~-se&-\lS -iB-W8l'z -l:l:mited

se& th&-nat4oo-&Bd-ta&-r&St-o!!-the-

narr-ow .merg4.n~

war -&P Wl.Hmi ted

W8r)

lndeedy-±t is a pertud
we:r-by-aee-ident-or-war-

"by Elesig&z=WQP-by-ehi-ld4sh~~--GJI-b~.

The crisis 1 Mr. President, is coming in Germany.
is coming in Berlin.

Indeed, it m3.y have already begun.

Specifically

For years now, the

seeds of that crisis have lain dormant in a divided Germany .
held in check only by a kind of mutual acquiescence.

it

They have been

The Western powers have

not wished to disturb the seeming stability i n Germany.

Since the Berlin

blockade, the Soviet Union has not seriously threatened it.

A few years ago,

uprisings ot East Germans shook the stability but did not break it.
Those who have thought at all about the German situation have known
for a long time that the surface calm would not last.

The existence of two

German authorities in what is one Germany bas been, from the end of World War
II , a makeshift arrangement .

The Western powers have recognized it.

Soviet Union has acknowledged it.

The German leaders know it.

The
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The key question has never been:
question has long

bee~:

will Germany be unified?

when and how will Germany be unified?

The

Those of us

who have urged an initiative in American policy with respect to Germany have
been aware of this distinction.

~fuen

I addressed myself to this subject in the

Senate in May, 1958, I had the distinction very much in mind.
tried to deal in the specifics of an American initiative.

Because I did, I

In suggesting, last

May, alternatives to present policy1 my thought was that when the status quo
gave way, as surely it must, the changes ought at least to hold promise of
leading to the stren3thening of freedom in a peaceful Germany.
We did nothing, Mr. President.

We took no initiative.

We went on

in the familiar vacuousness 1 in the familiar patterns of policy, patterns devi sed years ago, in another. setting, under another Administration.

~

We refused

~
~o face the fact that that policy was adequate to maintain a semblance of
stability in Germany only so long as all directly concerned acquiesced in the
continued division of that nation.
That is water under the bridge.

w.fl_

~~1a'a.t:t:on

to act in a positive fashion to change the status quo.
chosen to break it.

did not choose

Now, the Russians have

They have chosen to make the break at Berlin.

They have

said, in effect, that, after the spring of 1959, the situation will no longer
be as it has been in that city.

They are quite right, Mr. President.

will no longer be the same in Berlin or anywhere in Germany.

Things

If there is

any certainty, it is that the situatio:n in Germe.ny at the close of 1959 will
be

fa~

different from the present situation.

of the end, the

begi~ing

We are approaching the beginning

of the end of two Berlins and of two Germanies.

The question, as I have already observed, was never, would Germany
be unified?

It was when and how would Germany be unified?

iS

..A._

'l!he-A~

may now have begun to comprehend the when , the actual process of unification

- 3 -

is likely to begin this year.
unified?

Only one question remains:

how is Germany to be

Will it be by conflict, by negotiation, or by some mixt'll:'e of the two?

That is the question which is

~elling

us and the rest of the world towards

the coming crisis in Germany.

Constitutional Responsibilities in the German Crisis
The responsibility for establishing binding foreign policies to deal
with the impending crisis, the coming change in Germany, rests solely with the
President and his Secretary of State.

Let there be no doubt on that score , in

this b?dy, at home, in the Executive Branch or abroad.
Senate to direct the President in this matter.

It is not for the

The President will have to make

his own decisions with the assistance of the vast resources of the Executive
Branch.

When he speaks officially on Germany, however , he will be speaking for

all of us whether or not we agree with what he says.
under the Constitutional system of the lJnited

~re

is no other.Y.!}Y_

Stat~.

To say that is not to constrain upon the Senate a silence in these
matters.

On the contrary, since we wil1 be bound, since the people of the

United States shall be bound by what the President and his Secretary of State
do or fail to do in the coming crisis

the obligation of the Senate to debate,

to discuss, and to advise is real and it is comwelling.

This Senate of the 86th Congress was not constituted so that it might
ignore pressing domestic questions.

How much less then, can we remain silent

on the life and death matters of foreign policy?

The President and the Secre-

tary of State have given no indication that they would have this body turn its
back on the crisis

in

Germany.

On the contrary; I note that the Secretary of

J

•

- 4 -

State

has

already sought the counsel of the distinguished chairman of the

Committee on Foreign Relations (Mr. Fulbright).
initiative.

I commend the Secretaryfbr his

The brillient chairman of the Committee has much to contribute to

the development of policy for the situation in Germany.
If the Senate is to meet its responsibilities, Mr. President, we must
form, through debate and discussion, an understanding of the situation as it is
and as it is evolving in Germany.

\ole

must also discern clearly the stakes of

the people of the United States and of freedom in that situation.

We must ad-

vance, finally, ideas for consideration in formu2ating the foreign policies
which are to safeguard the vital interests of our people.
These are the thoughts which have led me to these remarks on the
coming crisis in Germany.

I make them in the spirit of responsible Democratic

cooperation with a Republican Administration in a matter of vital concern to
all the people of the United States.

Two German Authorities in

O~e

Germany

Let me begin by exploring the significant realities in Germany, as I
see them.

The basic reality, Mr. President, is that there are two political

authorities in one Germany.
stand.

That is a contradiction which cannot and will not

There is one Germany.

reasons which require that the

And there are con:pelling historic and practical
~ity

of that nation begin to emerge without

delay if there is to be peace in Europe and in the world.
I stress the point, Mr. President, that when we speak of the two
Germanies, we are really speaking not of two nations but of two political
authorities.

Each of these authorities presumes that it is the wave of the
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future in all Germany.

Each seeks to draw the whole of the German people into

its orbit.
To be sure, there are profound differences between the West German
government in Bonn and the East German communist regime in Pankow.

The Bonn

government is based upon prlnc:lples and practices of democracy which are consonant with those of other western nations and are expressly supported by the
inhabitants of West Germany.

The Pankow regime exists by the methods of au-

thoritarianisn which come from the East.

Its source of authority lies in the

will to power of those who wield the authority and the acquiescence- -however
sullen--of the repressed people of East Germany.

Its survival depends , to a

far greater degree than anything we know in the Western democracies, on military
and police power--its own and the Soviet Union's.
The West German democratic government exists.

It is there , at Bonn,

and the cOlllllunists are not going to wish it away or subvert it away.

It is

going to stay as long as the people in that zone sustain it and as long as the
Western nations remain committed to its protection against military aggression
from the East.
also exists.

We cannot ignore the fact, however, that the East German regime
It is there at Pankow, a.nd German communists run it, even though

Russians may pull the strings from behind the curtain.

Unfortunately, I see

no evidence that the Western nations are going to wish away or subvert away
that East German political authority in the practicable future .
If neither side can be wished away, or subverted away, how then is
the division of Germany going to be made to disappear?

How is a unified

Germany& this essential Germany, this inevitable Germany, going to emerge?
There was a time, perhaps, when it might have been reasonable to hope that
the Russians and German communists would soon find it too costly to maintain

- 6 their control in East Germany.
development.

For ye.a.rs we have waited for this promised

We have waited for the Russians and their camp-followers to fold

their tents and steal away.
What we must ask ourselves now is whether or not there is any realistic basi s for hoping that this development will come about in the practicable
future?

I regret to say that such public indications as there are suggest that

the Pankow regime, with Soviet support, is consolidating its position, that its
authoritarian hold on East Germany is , if anything, more secure today than it
was a few years ago.
If the Administration has information to the contrary, then it would
be helpful if it shared that information with the Senate and the people of the
nation.

It would be helpful if the Administration would give us an estimate

of the probable life span of the East German regime.

Will it take a month) a

year , five years or a decade for it to expire peacefully under present poli--........

cies?
It is all very well to hope, as a general principle, for the disappearance of totalitarianism.

~le

have held that principle for decades, but we

have also had to live in a world which has contained since its beginning and
still contains many totalitarian regimes.
No, Mr . President, a valid policy on Germany, now, must be built on
more than the hope of the eventual disappearance of German totalitarianism.
It can on1y be built on the premise that Germany, in one way or another , is
going to unify and it is going to begin to unify soon.

Further, it can only

be built on the premise that that unity in Germany, if it is to come in peace,
is likely to fall short of the ultimate goals set for it by both the Communist

- 7natiQas

~d ih~

tarian Germany

free nations- -the goal , on the one hand, of a communist totali-

~d

the goal, on the other, of a fully representative democracy

in al l Ger many.
Until a few months ago there might have been a possibility of evading
that r eality for a whil e longer by assuming that the status quo of division in
Germany might go on indefinitely.

But the pr ospect of evasion is now narrow-

ing r apidly in the wake of Mr. Khrushchev 1 s announcement of the coming Soviet
withdrawal from Berlin.

The blunt fact is that soon, either negotiations lead-

ing to German unification in peace shall begin in earnest or there shall begin
in earnest the use of f orce to that end.

Berlin--The Core of the Coming Crisis
This brings me to a second matter which we must explore, Mr. President, if we are to see our way clearly in the impending crisis .
question of Berlin.

That is the

It is at Berlin, divided Berlin, and along the western

routes of access to the city, that the first indications of the conflict leading to war or the success of negotiations leading to stable peace are likely
to appear in the coming months.

I shall not take the time of the Senate to review the historic
circumstances surrounding the present difficulties of the Western position in
Berlin.

It is simple enough to find fault with what was done or not done by

political and military leaders years ago.

It is as easy, as it is pompous,

to pass angry judgments on others, with the prop of hindsight.

That process

will serve no useful purpose in this situation.
Nor shall I take the time of the Senate to review the legal status
~

of our position in Berlin. ..!!'he-Executive-Branch may find some solace for our
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difficulties in legalism.
a.ctions in it.

Even the Russians sought justification for their

But legalism is at best a dubious way to deal with an explosive

situation, when there are, as there are in this situation, two opposing judges,
two opposing judgments, and two opposing

instrume~ts

of mass destruction for

enforcing t ee jue.grnents.
It does not much matter now1 bow we got to

s~y

nor why t he
~tter,

Mr.

in Berlin, as stay there we must .

We

Russians have no legal right to ask us to leave .
President, is Why we need to

F.e:..· .~in

Ynnat does

are, bluntly, in a biehJ.y difficult and dangerous position in Berlin.
sa.crifices may be entailed in remaining.

Great

We bad better understand cl ear1y

now the significance of maintai ning our position there.

We bad better under-

stand now what is vital and what is not vital in that position to the people
of the United States and to freedom.
The Administration has responded to the Russian proposals on Berlin
by reiterati.n g a long- standing view of the nation.

It bas said, as the

Democratic Administration before it said, that we will not be driven from
the city.

The position of this government, to stand firm in Berlin, bas been

endorsed by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

It is supported by Demo-

crats and Republicans alike in the Senate.
It is a sound position.
to say, Mr. President, that

not a policy.

Nor is it

Only it is not enough.

It is not enoU§b

we are standing fast in Berlin . That is a slogan

enough~

Mr. President, to stand fast merely to

demonstrate our determination to maintain our legal interpretation of the
situation as against the Soviet Union's.
Nor is it enough, t.fr. President, to say that we stand fast in Ber lin
so that we may continue to demonstrate in the heaxt of Communist Germany the
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material superiority of freedom or free enterprise over communist collectivism.
To be sure there is a striking contrast between West Berlin and East Berlin
but I doubt very much that the people of the United States will countenance
the sacrifice of a single human life for the purposes of propagandistic demonstrations in Berlin.

And before this year is out many lives may have been

spent in Berlin.
No, Mr. President, it is not for reasons of legalism or propaganda
that we stand fast in Berlin.

The Western nations are in Berlin< Mr. Presi-

dent, because Berlin belongs neither to East Germany nor West Germany; it belongs to all the German people.

We are in Berlin because some Germans may now

look to Bonn and others to Pankow for leadership, but all Germans will soon
look to Berlin.

We are in Berlin to see to it that when that city is once

again the capital of all Germany. as it surely will be, the concept of freedom
in peace will not be absent from the scene.

If that concept were to disappear

from Berlin, the citadel of German nationalism, sooner or later, it would disappear from all Germany.

Then, sooner or later, the torch would be lit in

Germany, whether by German hands or some other, to set Europe and the world
aflame once again.

That torch was lit twice in Berlin in the past and twice

the world has paid an enormous human price.

To see that it is not lit again

is in the essential, the vital interests of this generation and future generations of the people of the United States.
That, Mr. President, is the reason which beyond all others, justifies the taking of the great risks which we may soon be called upon to take
at Berlin and along the western routes to the city.

We are in Berlin in

order to get out, but to get out Only on condition that the German political
forces which stand for freedom in peace have a sure footing, an equal chance
to survive and to grow on their merits in the future capital of all Germany.
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I support fully the position of this Administration on the necessity
of standing fast in Berlin .
JUhnioistration

~

I question however, the adequacy with which tbe-

related that position to the changing situation in Germany.

I question a policy which provides that not

o~v

we stand fast in Berlin, but

also implo1·es or demands that the Russians stand fast.

After Y_ears of trying

to get the Russians out of the innumerable places into which they sprawled
after World War II , it is indeed st range to hear that we are insisting that
the Russians must not, indeed, cannot leave Berlin.

That is, Mr. President, a

most peculiar position to say the least 1 and the Russians obvi ously have no
intention of obliging us by remaining.
It is clear what is afoot there .

In a few months hence, the

Russians will leave East Berlin despite our commands or urgings to the contrary .

East Berlin will then be.1 once again, a German city- -communist, to be

sure--but nevertheless German.

By contrast, West Berlin will r etain the ap-

pearance it now has, the appearance of a Western enclave in the heart of
Germany, for there are thousands of allied officials and military personnel
in the area.

The contrast will not be lost on German nationalists, in East

or West Germany.
Further, Mr. President, if we ar e to hold this enclave without
struggle, it will be at the sufferance of the East German Communist authori ties.

If they do not choose to accommodate us, then we shall in all probabi-

lity have to fight our way through to Berlin, not against Russians but against
Germans .

Even if this course does not lead to a great conflict, the repercus -

sions in Germany will be profound.

Among Germans, as among others, blood may

prove thicker than ideologies.
As I said, Mr. President, there can be no quarrel with the need to
stand fast in Berlin.

I do question, however, a policy which does not
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anticipate the developments which I have just outlined and fails to take steps
to mitigate them.
I question, too, a policy which still pr esumes as our policy does
that the Great Powers of World War l i- -the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom,
France, ani the United States--can bring about German unification.
have been a time when such a course was possible.

If it ever existed, however,

it was years ago when Germany lay devastated and prostrate .
in the freshness of the common sacrifices of
of mutual respect and toler ance which these
Those years are gone.

Wor ~ ,l.

There may

It was years ago.

War II anc. i.n the meaFo• "":"e

sac~~fices

The time is not today.

engende=ed.
Today, there is

little respect between this nation and the Soviet Union except the fearful
respect which the military power of the one may gener ate in the other.
Germany is neither devastated nor prostrate, it

r~s

Today,

become once again the most

dynamic nation in Western Europe .
No, Mr. Presiient 1 the erstwhile allies, the divided allies of
World War II are not in a position to ordein a unification in peace for a
revitalized Germany.

At most, they cay be able to contribute to

~t

unifica-

tion by rethinking their own security needs in anticipation of its inevitable
development .

At most, they may be able to contribute to unification by exer-

cising such influence as they may possess to encourage the Germans themselves
to reach a reasonable procedure on unification and by sanctioning that procedure if it is sound .

It is the Germans, themselves, however , who will make

the decisive decisions on unification, if they are to be made in peace.

Free All-German Elections
Furthe~

Mr. President, I question , in present circumstances, a

policy which presumes to lead to the peaceful unification 1 of Germany solely
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on the basis of free , all-German elections.
on this point, only with more emphasis.

I say now what I said last May

Events have moved a long way since

this policy was devised and the bell no longer has an altogether recognizable
sound when it is rung over and over again in the same fashion.
tical av.thori ty has emerged in tie West.

A german poli-

Another political structure has ap-

peared

i~

the East which is manned by Germans, even if it is not directed by

them.

Whatever we may think of this structure, there is no reliable indica-

tion that it is going to go away, peacefully, of its own accord.
There are now military and para=military German forces in both East
and West Germany.

How are these forces to be integrated in peace?

Is this

a problem that can be solved by free, all-German elections, at least without
extensive preparations by the Germans who officer these opposing forces?
There are differing economic and social structures functioning in
Western and Eastern Germany.

How are these structures to be fused in peace?

Can they be harmonized by free, all-German elections, at least without extensive preparations by those Germans who operate them?
I cite these proble:ns as e:xamples.
similar nature.

There are no doubt others of a

A policy which advances no thought on how they are to be

met does not begin to meet the realities of the German situation.

If the

unification of Germany is essential and inevitable and if it is neither our
responsibility nor in the interest of this nation to seek that unity by
force then I submit that a. pol:fg¥ which merely clings to an unrealizable
slogan of free

a.ll-C~rman

elections, which does not pursue German unification

by other means, is no policy at all.
for immobility.

It is a strait-jacket.

It is an excuse

It may well lead down the blind alley of an unnecessary con-

flict or disastrous diplomatic retreat.

- 13 Military Withdrawal in Germany and Central Euro;pe
Finally 4 Mr. President. I question a policy which a;ppears to regard
as sacrosanct presP.nt military arrangements in Germany and Central Europe.
I can understand, I can accept, I can support the concept that Western
Germany's ties with Western Europe are essential to the peace of Europe and
they must not be broken.

Within that concept, however, I cannot comprehend

a view which seems to hold inflexibly to the present form and extent of German
rearmament.

We have accepted and even encouraged rises in the German military

contribution to NATO in certain circumstances

in

the past.

I do not see that

we cannot accept and encourage declines in that contribution in other circumstances.
Security needs are ever-changing needs.
is not an end in itself.
freedom

in

Western German rearmament

It is for the purpose of the defense of German

common with the defense of the freedom of the \ole stern connnuni ty.

It is not for the purpose of keeping rigid the tables of organization and
the projections of presumed needs by the military command of NATO.
projection~

in

These

any event, have not been met for years and the world has not

yet come to an end.
The nature and extent of German rearmament and of non-German
armaments on German soil, in short, is one area of the problem of unification
in which reasonable proposals for negotiation, wherever they may originate,
ought not to be rejected out of hand.

That is especially the case if these

proposals are related to the reduction of militexy power throughout Central
Europe.

I know full well that the Russians may have no intention of with-

drawing from the Eastern European states in any circumstances.

Nevertheless,

I can see no reason to make it easier for them to justify their remaining by
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I cannot see that the road to the

eventual freedom of states like Poland and Czechoslovakia is made easier by
such a process.

Russian Role in the Coming

Cri~

Mr. President, let me turn now to the

tions in the coming crisis in Germany.
certain course.

~uestion

of Russian inten-

In this matter there is only one

Wba tever they may do, we must assume that the Russians

acting to enhance the position of the Soviet Union and that of
communism throug!lout Germany and Europe.

a~e

totalitari~n

We must also assume that they will

use whatever methods they believe will lead to these ends, not excluding
aggressive war.

The Russians may blow hot or they may blow cold.

down e. plane on their border one day.
next.

They may

They may release e. blocked convoy the

We cannot know w1 th certainty why they act as t!:ey act at any given

moment.
We cannot know with certainty the purport of Mr. Mikoyan 1 s recent
visit to the United States.

We cannot know with certainty the meaning of

Mr. Khrushchev 1 s comments on a thaw in the cold war.

provide a setting for successful negotiations.

They may be meant to

They may be meant simply to

confuse or beguile.
If they do confuse, if they do beguile, however, we shall have no
one to blame but ourselves.

We ought to be able by this time years after
I

the ill- fated Geneva. Conference of

1255, to distinguish between the concilia-

tory gesture and the act of conciliation.

Those of us who came from the cold

country have learned througo bitter experience that winter thaws can be
followed by summer frosts.

The promise of spring in February is not the

same as the coming of spring in May.

..

- 15 There is, a.s I sa.y, no way of knowing with certainty wha.t some
particular Soviet gesture or other signifies .

What we can know, Mr. President,

is tha.t they a.re all> good or ba.d, peripheral to t he crisis which is coming
in Germany.

Mr . Miko:tan 1 s visit is not going to free us from that crisi s.

Mr. Krxuohchev ' s thaws will not do it.

Increased Soviet-American trade has

little relation to it.
If we a.re to be prepared to fa.ce this crisis in Germany, it will be
best not to become distracted or obsessed by the twists a.nd turns of Soviet
behavior.

It will be best to keep our eyes on Germe.ny.

The fundementa.l

question of policy for us is not so much what the Russians are looking for
in Germany .

We know what they a.re looking for and they may very well seize

it while we amuse or fascinate ourselves by tEYfng to interpret the charades
of Russian behavior.
No, Mr. President, more important, fa.r more important to us is to
know vhat we ourselves a.re seeking in Germany.
not onl.y courage but also conviction.

We must

We must bring to this crisis
brin~

to it a positive a.nd

understandable policy which roeets our essential national needs a.nd the
essential needs of freedom.

The Essentials of a

\-~es tern

Policy in the Coming Crisis

As I noted earlier in my remarks , it is not for the Senate to
direct the President a.nd the Secretary of State in the conduct of the foreign
reJations of the United Sta.tee .

But it is a. responsibility of Senators to

try to contribute constructive!Y to the policies which govern those relations.
It is in that sense, Mr. President, tha.t I seek, in these final comments, to
express the thoughts which this exploration suggests, thoughts on the

- 16 essentials of a sound Western policy for the coming crisis in Germany .
have no crystal ball.

I have no secret information.

I

What I suggest may not

be valid in the light of the greater understanding of others .

It is one

Senator's views based upon what he has read, what he has heard, what he has
tried to reason.

It is, in short, the course which suggests itself to me on

the basis of the understanding which I have been able to draw out of the confusion and complexity of the German situation.

I can be wrong ·and I stand

ready to accept a better illumination of the pr oblem through discussion and
debate in the Senate.

For whatever they may be worth, however, I outli.n e

the following points as essentials of a sound Western policy on Germany:
1.

It is essential, l4r. President, that forces representing the concept
of freedom in peace not be driven out of Berlin.

They need, at the

least , to remain on the basis of equality with the forces of totalitarian communi sm in the future capital of Germa?l ·
are to have a

cban~e

If those forces

to remain in peace a Western initiative for

peace is essential .
2.

It is time to call upon German leaders of the two Berlin communities
--East and West- - to begin serious efforts to unify the municipal
government and public services of that city.

3· To that end, Mr. President, it would be helpful to enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
If agreement ce.n be reached by East and vlest Germany to establish
an all-Berlin government, then it will be desirable to replace both
Soviet and Allied forces with a United Nations police force composed
of contingents from nations not directly involved.

That force

might supervise the agreement and see to it that all the routes of

..
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access to the city remain open until Derlin becomes once again the
capital of a peaceful unified Germany.

It may be that in the Derlin

microcosm there may evolve patterns of unification which 'vill be applicable to the larger problem of all-German unification.

4. If this approach or some such approach to a unified, neutralized Derlin
fails, Mr . President, then it is essential that the forces representing
the concept of freedom in peace in Derlin remain in Derlin whether or
not the Russians leave .

Let them go , if they will.

I would not wish

to see this country a party to any insistence that they stay.

5. At the same time, however, the forces representing freedom in Derlin
must be Germanized as rapidly as possible.

It is time to think

seriously of replacing the thousands of Allied military personnel in
Dcrlin with German militia., fully supported

by

NATO suare.ntees.

6 . Some may regard discussions between Germans of the

\~est and Germans of

the East as tantamount to recognition of the East German regime.

Some

who regard not only talk, but even thought, which is apparently alien
to them, on the serious problems of the Nation, as appeasement, may
even go so far as to label any proposals of meetings between East and
West Germans with this stamp of political chicanery.

Mr. President.
~t

Let them do it,

It is their privilege.
let me say this:

If talk constitutes recognition

or appeasement then t&!~ -Adm:lni~tratioa has appeased and rec ognized Communist China because a representative of this government
has been talking on its behalf, on and off for years, with a Chinese
Con:munist representative in Geneva and llarsaw.

If talk constitutes

..
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recognition or appeasement then the ¥Test Germans have recognized and
and appeased Pankow for years.

The fact is that East and West Germans

have worked out practical agreements of various kinds between the two
zones of Germany.

As early as

~957

Nest Germany's exports to East

Germany for the year totaled $201 million.

During the first half of

1958 $125 million in trade moved 1n each direction .

That kind of trade,

Mr. President, does not take place without talk.

I do not know what the theory of inter national law may be.
do not know whether talk is tantamount to recognition.

I

I do know that,

as a practical matter, we have talked with but not recognized Communist
China.
Pankow.

¥lest Germans have talked with and traded with but not recognized
What is involved in the coming crisis 1n Germany is not a

classroom problem of the theory of international law.
and death problem of peace and war.

It is the life

The stake is the lives of tens of

millions of human beings, Americans included .
I cannot see that there is going to be any peaceful solution
of

th~ s

problem without talk, a great deal of talkzt between Germans wl:o

are in author ity in the Federal Republic
in authority in the Eastern zone.
that~b is t.~:_1-~.k

~~d

Germans who purport to be

It seems to me essential, moreover,

cover the whole range of problems of unification of the

two zones, the whol e range of problems involving the harmonizing of the
political, economic and military systems of the two zones.

7.

There is a :;?Oi nt beyond vThich the search for peace can lead to the
j eopardizi~S

of freedom.

It seems to me essential that whatever

agreements emerge, the people of Eastern Germany must have some genuine
choice in the form of control which is exercised over them.

There must

..

- 19 be provision for the protection of the rigpts of all peaceful polit ical
forces in all Germany.

All-German el ections may not be essential- -but

at least there must be a chance for men and women of Easter n Germany
as well as Western Germany to express themselves and their political
preferences and to participate in political affairs without the threat
of terror.
Whatever the details of the fusion of the two zones, they are
best left to the Germans of the two zones.

The Germans are likely to

know better than anyone else what will suit them, what is possible among
them.

Further, it is inconceivable that the erstwhile allies of Wor ld

War II can work out these details on their behalf at this late date .

8. The contribution which the Western allies as

~rell

as the Soviet Union

need to make, if there is to be peace, is to guarantee for a period of
timet the kind of unified Germany which may emerge from discussions
among the Germans.

What the former allies need to do is to see to it

that a unified Germany is neither subjected to military pressures from
its neighbors nor that it becomes a source of military pressure to its
neighbors.

9· To that end, Mr. President, it is essential to include within the scope
of our policy the search for agreements which,while they do not compel
a severance of West Germany's numerous ties with Western Europe, may
lead to limitations of armaments throughout Germany and Central Europe.
Agreements are needed, too, 'vhich will pull back the so- called ultimate
weapons and the armed forces of both East and West from the points of
imminent contact in Germany and Central Europe .

In short, Mr . President

..
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it seems to me essential that our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration of the Rapacki Plan, the Eden Plan for a
demilitarized zone in Middle Europe or similar proposals in connection
with the unification of Germany.

Perhaps the best way to consider these

matters would be to predicate them on ageeements which may emerge from
the Geneva Conferences on Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of Nuclear Tests.

******
Mr. President, I have taken a great deal of the Senate 's time today.

I have tried not to take it lightly.

I have done so because it is clear that

this Administration, following the example of its predecessor, has committed the
nation to stand fast at Berlin.
It is a resolve well taken.

Since we cannot yet perceive to what

extremity of sacrifice it may lead in the months ahead, I have felt it essential
to

try to set forth for the consideration of the Senate my understanding of what

is involved in the coming crisis in Germany.

I am grateful that in this crucial

time the Senate's principal member in these matters, the outstanding Senator
from Arkansas (Mr. Fulbright) is a man with such a deep understanding and intelligent grasp of the international forces that play on the nation.

I hope

that he will make his voice heard i I am sure that the President and the Secretary

of State will listen most carefully.

I would hope, further, that between

them will evolve a policy that all of us, as Americans, will be glad to support.

. .
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Most important, Mr. President, I hope that the President of the
United States, his Secretary of State, and the Congress will fortify the
resolve to stand fast in Berlin with the conviction which only a positive
policy for peace can give it.
concessions.

The Secretary of State ha.s spoken of mutual

Those are calm and wise words for this moment in time , with the

clouds of radioactive death waiting to envelope the earth.
that they will lead to a positive policy for peace.
policy for which rational men everywhere are waiting.

I hope, deeply,

It is that kind of a
It is that kind of a

policy which they will be able to comprehend and to which, if need be, they
will be able willingly to consecrate their lives.
That policy bas yet to be formed.

It needs to be formed soon .

If

it is formed> the concept of freedom in peace will not perish in Berlin, in
Germany or in the world.
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SENATOR MIKE MANSFIELD

THE COM IN G CRIS I S IN GERMANY

ILLNESS OF SECIU:I'ARY OF STATE
DULLES

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. before I proceed to the remarks which I
Intend to make on the German situation,
I wish to say that I am deeplJ1 distressed
by the news of the lllncss o! the Secretary o! State.
The duties o! the Secretary of State
are just about the most exacting and
strenuous In the Government. not excluding the Presidency. The Intellectual
demands o! the job are enormous. The
physical demands arc appalling. For
years. Secretary Dulles has borne up under them without complaint. His stamIna and durability have been little short
or Incredible. However, In the Secretary,
as In other men. there is a physical limit.
Hts total personal dedication to the servIce o! the Nation has taken Its toll of
his health. As one doctor put It, the
Secretary Is worn out. It Is a shame,
Mr President, that the Nation has reN

2~

quired so. much o! one man. And It Is
to the Nation's detriment. moreover, that
he has had to push himself beyond the
limit.
We can Ul afford to lose his services
at any time. We can spare them least
.at this moment. Secretary Dulles Is
needed as never before to complete the
very delicate negotiations on Berlin and
Germany which he had just begun so
a usplclously.
Mr. Dulles has capaole associates In
the Department of State. With all due
respect to them, however, the Secretary
will be sorely miSsed In the weeks ahead,
The Nation needs his great experience,
his balance, his strength, his ability to
decide.
I share with the President and the
Nation the feeling of distress which the
Secretary's illness brings. I know the
Senate joins with me in wishing Mr.
Dulles a full recovery and a prompt return to his key role In the search for a
secure peace.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator from Montana yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I endorse everything that has been said by the distinguished Senator from Montana concernIng the illness of Secretary or State
Dulles and the work which he has been
doing. I have often marveled, as I am
certain many other persons have, at his
stamina. I tecall reading In the press
recently that during the time Mr. Dulles
has been Secretary of State, he has
traveled more than 500,000 mUes. He
has made many long journeys, and often
after his return, perhaps within a day or
two, he would be oli on another long
trip.

I first knew Mr. Dulles when he
served for a short time in the United
States Senate. But I came to know
him better when J. served with him in
the United Nations as a delegate In 1950
and, subsequent to that time, for the
ensuing 12 months.
On September 8, 1950, at about 12
o'clock' noon, President Truman called
Mr. Dulles to the White House. Mr.
Dulles at that time was an assistant m
the Department of State under the then
Secretary of State Acheson. President
Truman asked Mr. Dulles on that day i1
he would be willing to assume the responsibility of formulating the Japanese
Peace Treaty, and In getting the two
score or more nation~ which would be
parties to the con!erence to agree to
its general terms.
If an assignment can be imagined
which was more difficult and more complex than that of bringing together some
40 nations of the world which were greatly concerned about the terms of the Japanese peace treaty, I cannot conceive of lt.
But Mr. Dulles undertook to do the JOb.
Mr. Dulles told me later that President
Truman asked him at the time how long
it would take. Mr. Dulles replied that
he thought it would take a year. Mr.
Truman then said, "I will give you one
year in which to finish the job."
At that time I was the chairman of the
Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs of
the Comnuttee on Foreign Relations. I
became a member of the committee in
January 1951. Naturally, I had a clo:>c
relationslup v.;th Mr. Dulles in his work
during the entire year 1951. I was in
conference frequently with him, because
this was a Far Eastern question. The
subcommittee and our assistants met
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with Mr. Dulles at all times of the day,
sometimes In the morning, sometimes at
lunch, sometimes In the afternoons or
evenings. I feel quJte certain that durIng the time the treaty was being formulated, the Subcommittee on Far Eastern Affairs, Mr. Dulles, and his associ·
ates had probably 100 different meetings.
I have often said It was one of the most
remarkable jobs I ever saw any man perform . I t was not easy to bring together
the British, on one hand, and the Nat ionalist Chinese, on the other. It was
not easy to bring together the Southeast
Asia. nations and the central European
nations. But gradually Mr. Dulles wove
a plan under which all nations were at
least willing to attend a conference.
The conference was held In the San
Francisco Opera House. It ended on
September 8, 1951. Just before we left
the Opera House, I said to Mr. Dulles,
"This Is the anniversary of the day you
ltlldertook to do this work. At what
time of the day did President Truman
assign It to you?" Mr. Dulles replied
that It was at 12 o'clock noon. I looked
at my watch, and. making allowance for
the difference In time between Washington and Calltornla, I said to him, "You
have 8 minutes to spare." In other
words, the time lacked 8 minutes of
being 1 year from the time Mr. Dullea
had undertaken to do the work.
Following the conference. former Senator Smith. of New Jersey; Mr. Dulles,
a cting !or Mr. Truman and Secretary
of State Acheson : and I visited " number
of the Far Eastern coWltnes. We spen~
several weeks in Japan, working v. 1th
the diiJercnt. groups there in arnvmg at
understandlll!!S. as best we could, and
working on the rather d1fficult. problem
Involving Nnt1onahst Chma, pnrttcul arly, and the whole China problem, as
well.
I t was tht'n that I came to admire Mr.
Dulles. I ndm1red h1s t<·nac1t.y, his power
of intellect, and hiS :.kill in negotiating.
One of the great. S(.'t'Vices he has performed ns Secretary of Statt' has been
In t.he field of necollatln~ between nations which had differences and problems wh1ch were most difficult to sotve.
I share the fel'hn~ whtch has been
expressed by my cood fliC'n<l , the Senator from Montana. a!! to the nt'('d for
Mr. Dulles at present to deal \Hth the
particular probh m about which the
Senator from Montana v.:111 speak to us
today. I nm deliGhted to know that
smce Mr. Dullt>.s' ph)'l;lcnl condition IS
such that his docto1s 11dvise his taking
leave and <'ntcnng n hospital, he has
acted on that aclvlce. I hope he \\ ll1
remain a\1·ay fronl his work for as much
time as v.1ll be nccc ary to result In a
complete 1cstoratlon of hts health.
which I am confident \\Ill take place,
beCIIU~C I kllO\Io .somethlllC Of the physIC:JI stamina of the man.
I wtsh him n speedy recovery and a
return to Ius positiOn as Secretary or
~;tate just as soon as h<' 16 able to do so.
I lcrl C<'rtaln that his inftucnce
be
ft :t In the n<' otlatlons In the various
confc.rcnccs \\'hlch will be hl'ld In the
future. I know thnt his as~tlstants In
the Dcpartnwnt of State who have
workt'd with him for so long and so well
w11l be able to carry on. I am sure they

'"lll

will support Mr. Dulle!!, and that hla
negotiating ability will be felt 1n the conferences, and will continue to be he)pful
even In his absence.
Mr. AIKEN. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. AIKEN. I have been very happy
to hear the expressions of good will toward Secretary Dulles which have been
spoken today. I wish to join In them.
I have been a member of the Committee on Foreign Relations only <l years,
and have not been so,closely associated
with the work of Mr. Dulles as has the
Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN ].
for Instance, who has just concluded his
very fine statement.
I think few men In public life have
given so much of their time during so
many years of their lives to the formulation and administration of foreign polIcy as has Secretary Dulles. I know the
Nation Is grateful to him tor h is accomplishments. I know ours Is a bipartisan
gratefulness, also, as the Senator from
Alabama has well expressed.
I do not suppose that all of Mr. Dulles'
plans have materialized as he hoped
they would. But we must r ecall that he
has been serving a.s Secretary of State
and as adviser to the Secretary of State
during one of the :most critical periods
of history, and many of the most dl.alcu!L problems the world has faced have
come before him for solution. We have
seen the ooluUon of rome situations
which were considered vlrtuaJly Insoluble-for instance. the situation 1n
Trieste. I know all of us are happy to
learn that there are proopects of permanE-nt peace and harmony In the ll'lland
of Cyprus, where the Turlul and the
Greeks have come to an agreement.
I believe the whole world owes a considerable debt to Mr. Dullt'S. I wish to
jom my colleagues m hopmg that Mr.
Dullt>s will have a speedy recovery, followmg his trip to the hospital, and
soon w1ll again be back at work. Even
though everything may not have r.one
as he hoped It would, yet I know of no
ono who could hnve achieved n la~er
perce-ntage of success than he has over
thl'se troublesome years.
~1r. MANSFIELD. I t.hank U1e Senator from vermont.
Mr. CARL<;ON. Mr. P rc-;ldt'nt, will
the Senator from Montana yie-ld to me?
The PRESIDING OFFICER. Doca
the Senator f1·om Montana yield to the
Scn3.tor from K ansas?
~1r. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. CARLSON. I appreciate very
much the opportumty to associate mysctr with the remarks of the actmg ma.JOnty leader I Mr. ;:\1ANSFJ&J.D I. the Senator from Alnbamn !Mr. SP,\RKMAN), and
the Senator from Vermont I Mr. AIKF.Nl.
In re ard to t.he Secretary of State, Mr.
Dulles.
It Sl'em.~ to me tl1at at this time. which
seems to be one of our great.cl;t lntcrnntlonal crises. our Nation and the
other nations of the world can Ill afford
to spare the services of tJl1s most able
Dl9.!1.

secretary Dulles has demonstrat~d not
only his ability, but, It seems to me, a
peculiar temperament for worklng In
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thl.s fleld. I think he gets that temperament and that background from being a
great Christian layman. His Interests
are ln people. I believe that Is what we
need during this period 1n the world's
history. I think that one of our prob·lems at the present ume Is to learn how
to live with other people. Our generation has not done so well; as a matter
of fact, we have fought about three wars
In one generation. Somehow, In some
way, our young people, the coming generation, must learn how to live. with other
people. When we learn to do that, I ~
lieve we shall be able to accompllsh
much In bringing about the peace and
the economic conditions that all us of
are praying and hoping for.
I wish for the Secretary of State a
most speedy recovery. We need him. I
know he will receive the best of care that
doctors and medical skill can proVide.
So we look forward to his return to
service.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the Senator from Kansas.Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point 1n the
RECORD, as a part of my remarks, a radio
commentary by Jack Jurey on February
10, 1959, the evening of the announcement of the leave of absence for the Secretary of State.
1'here being no objection. the statement was ordered to be l>rint.cd 1n the
REcoRD. as follows:
Thla Ia Jnck Jurey with the WTOP comment tor tonight.
The neweat lllneu of Secretary ot Stat..
0\tllea should cause u.s all to Join President
Elarnhow~ In extending beat wishes to thta
dedlcl\tt'd omclal who, however much one
may <llsagTee with his policies, has workt'd
10 tlroleS$Iy on behalf of the United States.
We IOD& ago loot track of the total mllenge
log&ed by Mr Dulle• In hta peripatetic quest
tor peace, or tbe number of &tops be baa
ml\<le. or the numh<-r or omclata to whom ho
hM talked In virtually all quarters of tho
globe.
But we <lo know this; that John Fos~r
Dulles since 1953 has expended his energies
and hanlth at a reckless rate, at a ttm" of
life wh~n m06t of us would be resigned to
settttna: down with pipe and sllpper8. &pt'CiaUy tlnce his operntton for cancer, he has
<ll ~playe<J an uncommon devotion to duty.
Thla nt-wsman reo.qlls parttculnrly t Hit
After his ncxt-to-lnst Illness, a bout with
dlv<·rtlculltus. M.r. Dulles apologized to a
nowa conference tor not having seen reporters for a period of several weeks. Such
an apology was not only unusual In an
administration which sometimes seems to
Ulkl' a lacl<adnlslenl attitude toward newsmen, but "-'NI expre.o;,•lve or the lnner stutT
of this unusually gifted man. In n•a.ny re·
apecta he Is a f:\r better public servant than
10me or his critics would ha,·e us believe.
Speaking of cr1t1cs, It seems an appropriate
time to mention that many Amerlcnns may
noL comprehend what has happen~ In the
last decade to the omce whlcb Mr. Dulles
bolda.
For well o\'er a c~>ntury and a hair, a Secretftry of State Will, for the rn0$t part a
Cabinet otllclal aub)ected only to compnrattvely minor strAins. for the reason that the
United St.,teo; consl<lert'd lt.selr (and "'as,
for the mo.t part) a remote Island In the
V83t aea o f tnternattonal troubles. ln the
occulonal pt'rlod when tbe Nation was confrontec2 by brutal world realities. It was often
tbo Pre-sident bl-lf who bore tbc brunt:
Jcol!'erson, Madison. LI1\COin, Wilson, Franklin Rooscvca.
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The poet-World War II years, however , have
seen an evolution ancl elevation or the Secretary or State's duties, to the point where
this single man. whether he be George Marshall. Dean 4beson, or Dulles, has day-to day responslbllttles unparalleled In American
history.
The reason, or course, Is this country's reluctant emergence as a massive world power,
with all the trials and tribulations that such
a status Implies. The world struggle with
communism, conducted on multidimensional levels. Is enough to strain the strength.
patience, and resource&- or an]t man, and
certainly one who, like Secretary Dulles, must
carry with him the burdens of advanced age
d the demands ot an active Christian
science.
e are among those who believe that, on
ion. Mr. Dulles has been mistaken. We
er, tor example, that In some rest>eCts
tailed to demonstrate the resiliency
d that new clrcumstnnces demand,
h this criticism does not, tor a moeny the Intellectual quaiiOcatlons
rings to his task.
o criticize, of course. could be
ly history will tell. But the fact
mur on o~caslon does not diminish
our res
t tor the man himself, one who
ry heavy load Indeed.
carries a
Nor do
rltlclsm obscure the undeniable
hls moment or history, with the
fact that
Reds pou
g. on the door or West Berlin,
lies Is very nearly an IndiaSecretary
pensable
to his country. It would be
eat concern should he not
a matter
th and not be able to resume
r - ain his
e State Department.
hi\ duties a
For both
sonal nd national reasons
hop
at Secretary Dullea
k r
peratlon and will be
ulder the run weight

THE COMING CRISIS IN GERMANY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr., Presldent. let
me preface my remarks with this assurance to the senate: I am not an alarmist.
I measure most carefully the words I am
about to speak. In that con~xt, I ex:
press to the Senate my belief that just
ahead lies the most critical period which
the United States will have had to face
since the contllct In Korea.
The crisis, Mr. President, Is coming In
Germany. Specifically, It Is coming In
Berlin. Indeed, It may have already
begun.. For years now, the -!>eeds of that
crisis have lain dormant In a divided
Germany. They have been held In
check only by a kind of mutual acqulescense. The Western Powers have not
wished to disturb the seeming stability In
Germany. Since the Berlin blockade,
the Soviet Union has not seriously
threatened lt. A few years ago, uprisIngs ot East Germans shook the stability,
but did not break it.
Those who have thought at all about
the German situation have known for a
long time that the surface calm would
not last. The existence of two German
authorities In what Is one Germany has
been, from the end of World War II, a
makeshift arrangement. The Western
Powers have recogn.lzed it. The Soviet
Union has acknowledged it. The German leaders know it.
The key question has never been, W ill
Germany be unified? The qUestion has
long been, When and how will Germany
be unified? Those of us who have urged

an Initiative In American policy with respect to Germany have been aware of
this distinction. When I addressed myself to this subject in the Senate In May
1958, I had the distinction very much in
mind. Because I did, I tried to deal In
the specifics of an American initiative.
In suggesting, last May, alternatives to
present policy, my thought was that
when the status quo gave way, as surely
It must, the changes ought at least to
hold promise of leading to the strengthening of freedom In a peaceful Germany.
Mr. CHURCH. Mr. President wlll the
senator from Montana yield to me?
Mr. MANSFIELD. Ml'. President, I
am delighted to yield to my distinguished
friend from Idaho.
Mr. CHURCH. I wish to apologize
for Interrupting so soon the remarks
of the Senator from Montana, because I
believe that the address he Is delivering
will be a most significant one. But I
wish to say that, characteristically, In
his opening remarks the Senator from
Montana has pierced to the nub of the
Issue. Conditions In Germany are going
to change. Germany will not Indefinitely
remain divided against itself. Germany
will not Indefinitely continue to be garrl90ned by foreign troops.
It seems to me that those who say our
foreign policy must be Inflexible overlook the fact that ow·s Is not a static
world.
Therefore. Mr. President. I think the
Senator from Montana rendered us a
service when, a year ago, he emphasized
the fact that conditions in Germany
would be changing. and that we must be
prepared to face up to those changes If
we are to cope effectively with them.
Flexibility In our foreign policy Is a
must. A steel blade bends. Pig iron
breaks.
,
I wish to thank the Senator from Montana for coming forward at this stage
In the developing Berlin crisis with a
speech which will be helpful in giving
guidance to all of us, to the President.
and to the Secretary of State, in our
common effort to solve that crisis for
the benefit of the free world.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank my friend
from Idaho.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President. at this
point will the Senator from Montana
yield briefly to me?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I am delighted to
yield.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. Prezldent, we have
just-returned to this Chamber from a
most Impressive joint session with the
other body, In connection with the celebration of the !50th anniversary of the
birth of Abraham Lincoln. At the joint
session, during a brllllant address by the
great writer and poet. Carl Sandburg, he
had occasion to quote a sentence from
Abraham Lincoln, which I believe Is pertinent today in connection with the
splendid address which my friend, the
Senator from Montana, Is makl.ng on the
German question. Lincoln said:
The dogmas of the quiet pa.at are Inadequate for the stormy present.

I wish to congratulate my friend, the
Senator from Montana. tor the fine address he Is making on the German problem.
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However. I would not be true to myself if I did not register a slight dissent
from some of the comm~nts which have
been made with respect to the Secretary
of State.
It is unpleasant and unrewarding to
say unkind things about a man who is
in physical pain, who has shown great
physical courage, who is unquestionably
a patriot. who is a man of great dedication to the public interest; but I would
feel untrue to myself if I did not register
on the fioor of the Senate a dissent to
the statement that he is indispensable
to the conduct of our foreign policy in
the immediate future. I call attention
to what I have said on other occasions
with respect to this matter.
I hope that these comments wilJ be
taken in good part, and that it will be
Wlderstood that I make them only because I cannot remain silent when it
might be indicated that I was in accord
with what has been said.
I thank the Senator for yielding.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate what
the distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania has just said. I commend him
for his honesty and his integrity. Of
course, I recognize that It is not a new
viewpoint on his part. but that he has
been consistent in his views in this respect for some time. I would point out.
however, that the immediate danger, as
I see It, is the Berlin and the German
situation. No one knows more about
those situations at the present time or
Is better prepared to lead the allies in
meeting them than Is the Secretary
of State. On that basis. as well as on
other basis, I wish him well. I wish him
a speedy recovery. I anticipate that in
the not too distant future he wiJI resume
his duties. and will act, not as his own
agent, but as the agent of the President
of the United States, in conducting foreign policy.
Mr. CLARK. Obviously, I do not wish
to enga ge in a colloquy of extended duration with my colleague at this time.
I should like to be recorded as very
much hoping and praying for Mr. Dulles'
Immediate recovery; but I cannot agree
that there are not in the State Department others as well or better qualified
than the secretary to carry on the German negotiations. I appreciate that this
Is a situation on which the distinguished
Senator from Montana and I disagree.
I shall desist froni fw·ther comment on
this particular phase.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I shall desist, also.
Mr. President. I repeat, In suggesting,
last May, alternatives to present policy,
my thought was that when the status
quo gave way, as surely it must. the
changes ought at least to hold promise
or leading to the strengthening of freedom in a peaceful Germany.
We did nothing, Mr. President. We
took no Initiative. We went on In the
familiar vacuousness. in the familiar patterns of policy patterns devised years
ago, in another setting, under another
administration. We did not face the
fact that that policy was adequate to
maintain a semblance of stability .in
Germany only so long as all directly concerned acquiesced in the continued division of that nation.
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That fs water under the bridge. We
did not choose to act In a positive fashIon to change the status quo. Now, the
Russians have chosen to break lt. They
have chosen to make the break at Berlin.
They have said. In ettect, that, after the
spring of 1959. the situation will no
longer be as It has been In that city.
They are quite right, Mr. President.
Things will no longer be the same In Berlin or anywhere In Germany. If there
Is any certainty, It Is that the situation
In Germany at the close of 1959 will be
far different from the present situation.
We are approaching the beginning or
the end. the beginning of the end of two
Berllns and of two Germanys.
The question. as I have already observed. was never. Would Germany be
unified? It was, When and how would
Germany be unltled? We may now have
begun to comprehend the when; the
actual process or unlftcatlon Is likely to
begln this year. Only one question remains: How Is Germany to be unified?
Will It be by confilct, by negotiation, or
by some mixture of the two? Thnt Is
the question which Is lmpellins us and
the rest o! the world toward the coming
crisis In Germany.
CONSTITUTIONAL II~PON~I'IILrri'U IN TJIC
COWAN Clll•IS

The resporulblllty for establishing
binding foreign policies to deal with the
impending crl~ls. the coming change In
Germany. rests with the President and
his Secretary of State. Let there be no
doubt on that score, ln this body. at home.
fn the executive branch, or abroad. It
Is not for the Senate to direct the President In this matter. The President will
have to make his own de<:l$lons, With
the assistance of the vast resources or
the executive branch. When he ~peaks
officially on Germany. however. he will
be speaking for all or WI, v.hether or not
v.•e agree with what he says. There is
no other way under the constitutional
&ystem of the United States.
To say that Is not to constrain upon
t he Senate a silence In these matters.
On the contrary, since we ~hall be bound,
since the people or the Umted States
shall be bound, by what the President
and his Secretary of State do or fall to
do In the coming crl~ls. the obli"at10n or
the Senate to debate. to discuss, and to
advise Is real nnd It 1S compelling.
The Senate of the 86th Congress v.·as
not constituted so that It miRht Ignore
pressing domestic questions. How much
less then, can we remain Silent on the
life-and-death mntters of foreign policy?
The President 11nd the Secretary of State
have given no Indication that they would
have this body turn Its back on the cns!s
fn Germany. On the contrary, I note
that the Secretary of State has already
soullht the counsel of the dtstlngulshed
chairman of the Committee on Foreign
Relations !Mr. FULDRICIIT). I commend
the Secretary for his Initiative. The
bnlllant chairman or the committee has
much to contribute to the development
or policy for the situation In Germany.
H the Senate Is to meet Its responsibilities. Mr. President, we must form,
throu~~:h debate and discussion. an understanding or the situation as It Is, and ns
It is evolving in Germany. We musL also

discern clearly the stakes of the people of
the United States and of freedom In
that situation. We must advance, finally, Ideas for consideration In formulating the foreign policies which are to
safeguard the vital Interests of our
people.
'Ihese are the thoughts which have led
me to these remarks on the coming crlsts
in Germany. I make them In the spirit
of responsible Democratic cooperation
with a Republican administration in a
matter of vital concern to all the people
ot the United States.
TWO CERMA!Il AUTHORITIES IS ONJ. Cl:llMANT

Let me begin by exploring the significant realities In Germany, as I see them.
The basic reality, Mr President, Is that
there are two political authorities in one
Germany. 1 hat Is a contradiction
which cannot and will not stand. There
Is one Germany. And there are compelling historic and practical reasons
which require that the unity ot that nation begin to emerge without delay If
there Is to be peace In Europe and In the
world.
I stress the point. Mr President, that
when we speak of the two Germanles
we are really speaklng not of two nations
but of two political authorities. Each of
these authorities presumes that It Is the
wave or the future In all Germany. Each
seeks to draw the v. hole of the Getman
people Into Its orbit.
To be sure. there are profound dlfYerences betv.een the West Gt'rman government in Bonn and the East German
Communist regime In Pankow. The
Bonn government is based upon principles and practices of dl!mocracy v. hlch
are consonant with those of other Western nations and are expressly supperted
by the Inhabitants of West Germany.
The Pankow re1:1me exists by the methods of authoritananl•m which come from
the East. Its source of authority lies In
the w1ll to power of those who wield the
authority and the acquiescence-however sullen-of the repressed people of
East Germany. Its survival depends, to
a far ~:renter dPr,ree than anytlum~ we
know In the Weste1·n democraCit'S, on
military and pollee power-Its own and
the Soviet Unlon·s.
The Wt'st German dl'mocratlc r.overnment exists. It is there. at Bonn, and
the Communists are not gom~r to v.lsh 1t
away or subvert It away. It Is gomg to
stay as long as the people In that zone
sustain it and ns long ns the Western
nations remain comm1tted to Its prot('ction against military agsre~~lon from the
East. We cannot Ignore the fact however. that the East German regime , I .o
exists. It 1.:; there at Pankow. and German commumsts run It, even thou h
Russians may pull the strings from behind the curtain. Unfortunately, I sec
no evidence that the 'Vest ern nations are
goinr to wish away or subvert away that
East German political authonty In the
practicable future.
If neither side can be wished away, or
subverted away, how then is the diVlslon
or Germany going to be made to disappear? How ls a unified Germany,
this essential Germany, this Inevitable
Germany. going to emerge? There was
a time, perhaps, when It might have been
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reasonable to hope that the Russians and
German Communists would soon find It

too costly to maintain their control in
Enst Germany. For years we have
waited for this promised development.
We have waited for the Russians and
their campfollowers to fold their tents
and steal away.
What we must ask ourselves now is
whether there Is any ree11stic basis for
hoping that this development wUI come
about m the practical'le future? I regret to say that such public indications as
there are suggest that the Pankow regime, with Soviet support. is consolidatln~~: Its position, that its authoritarian
hold on Enst Germany Is, if anything,
more secure today than it was a few
years ago.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield for a question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Wi th respect to the
lasL thought expressed, the Senator from
Montana has stated that the authoritarian hold on East Germany is now
greater than it was before. Will the
Senator deal a little more in·detaU with
that, and state whether the hold Is the
result o! the power of the Communists,
or whether it is the v. ill of the people that
they be held by the Communists?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I should be deliGhted to try to answer my distinguished
!ucnd from Ohio. I can say. of course,
without equ1vocat1on that the pre~ent
5tatus Is not the desire or the will of the
people. 'I he source of my statement is
the US. Nev.s & World Report, the issue
of February 13. 1959.
I read from page 67. at the bottom:
E &t 0 rmnn~·s Communist government
hils )un publl•hcd otrlclal figures on Its
plnnncd exprndlturu tor 1959.

Before I read further I wish to say
that all the Information I have in my
presentation has appeared ln the public
prmt.. There is nothing secret or official
about what I am saying, and It simply
rt'l>re•ents one Senator's opinion as to
what I think Is the most dtftlcult and
dan ~erous question of today.
I continue with the quotation from
the U.S. News & World Report:
We t G~rmnn nnnnclnl experts, looking
Into the Reds' figures. In tbe budget and
out <·! lt. m nde n fttnrtllng discovery.
Mllltnrv aprndll g by the East Germsn
Reds In 1959 Is to be 30 percent higher thnn
mlllt.nry apendlng planned by West Germany.
Yet the Reds sa)· that West Gcrmnny 1a
threMenlhg the JX:ICe ot the world.

That Is what I mean when I say that
the Pankow regime IS more secure, not
In a political sense but in a military
6eru;c. 1 hey have been strenRthemng
thcmseh·es on a military and paramilitary basis. Of course. the 22 to 28 Soviet
dtvls10ns are still m East Germany
Mr. I.AUSCHE. I a"ree with the Senator. My mchnatJon would be to believe that the people of East Germany,
If they hnd U1e opporturuty, would unshackle thPmselves of the hold which
the Soviet has upon them.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is absolutely correct. I have been told that
the fl~ure would run ao; high as 95 to 96
percent o! U1e East Germans who, if
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they had the opportunity to vote, would
vote against the present Ulbricht regime.
Mr. LAUSCHE. But the fact is that
the Soviets and those of East Berlin who
agree with the Soviets are applying constantly heavier pressure in the development of the military?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
correct.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator
very much.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, it is
all very well to hope, as a general principle, for the disappearance of totalitarianism. We have held tl'lat principle
for decades. but we have also had to
live In a world which has contained since
Its beginning and st111 contains many
totalitarian regimes.
No, Mr. P resident, a valid policy on
Germany, now, must be built on more
than the hope of the eventual disappearance of German totalitarianism. It can
only be built on the premise that Germany, In one way or another, Is going to
unity and It Is going to begin to unity
soon. Further, It can only be built on
the permlse that that unity In Germany,
It It Is to come In peace, Is likely to tall
short of the ultimate goals set tor It by
both the Communist nations and the tree
nations-the goal, on the one hand, of a
Communist totalitarian Germany. and
the goal, on tl'le other, of a fully representative democracy In all Germany.
Until a few months ago there might
have been a possibility of evading that
reality for a while longer by assuming
that the status QUO of division In Germany might go on Indefinitely. But the
prospect of evasion Is now narrowing
rapidly In the wake of Mr. Khrushchev's
announcement of tl1e coming Soviet
withdrawal !rom Berlin. The blunt !act
Is that soon either negotiations leading
to German unification in peace shall begin 1n earpest or there shall begin In
earnest the use ot torc:e to that end.
8EitLIN~HE

COllE OF THlt CONING CRISIS

This brings me to a second matter
which we must explore, Mr. President, If
we are to see our way clearly In the impending crisis. That Is the question of
Berlin. It Is at Berlin, divided Berlin.
and along the wester~a routes of access to
the city, that the first indications of the
conflict leading to war or the success
ot negotiations leading to stable peace
are likely to appear In the comlng
months.
I shall not take the time of the Senate
to review the historic circumstances surrounding the present difficulties of the
western position In Berlin. It Is simple
enough to find fault with what was done
or not done by political and military
leaders years ago. It Is as easy, as It Is
pompous. to pass angry judgments on
others. with the prop of hindsight. That
process will serve rto useful purpose in
this situation.
Nor shall! take the time ot the Senate
to review the legal status of our position
In Berlin. Some may find solace for our
difficulties in legalism. Even the Russians sought justification for their actions In lt. But legalism is as best a
dubious way to deal with an explosive
situation, when there are, as there are in
this situation, two opposing judges, two

opposing judgments, and two opposing
instruments of mass destruction for
enforcing the judgments.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I wish the Senator
from Montana would discuss in a little
greater detail the element of legalism
being Introduced. I have my own understanding of it. I think we are advocating the proposition that there are
certain legal obligations rooted In agreements which we have made in the past,
and that In making our demands we Insist upon adherence to those obllga tlons.
Does the Senator mind discussing that
question?
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator from
Ohio Is correct. References have been
made to the agreements made at Potsdam relative to the occupation of Berlin.
References have been made to the
agreement entered Into by Gen. Lucius
Clay, at that time commander of our
forces In Germany, with the Soviet authorities. by means of which we were
guaranteed by the Soviet authorities access by rail, by road, and by air, from
the western zones In Germany Into the
western sectors of Berlin.
Then, as I recall-and I believe the
Senator will corroborate me on thissome sort ot agreement was made by
Mr. Phillip Jessup and a Russian representative whose name I cannot recall
at the moment, which agreement Mayor
Willy Brandt brought to our attention
at the luncheon held 1n the Foreign
Relations committee room the other
day. If I remember correctly, he stated
that out ot these Jessup-Russian consulto.tlons • nnd n.greementa,
which
brought an end to the need for the
allied airlift into Berlin. also came an
agreement that we be allowed contlnued
access. He suggested that we look Into
the agreement to which he referred as
the agreement of 1949. Unfortunately
I have not had an opportunity to do so
yet.
But there are these agreements, or alleged agreements. which give us the
right to go in and to maintain access
between the western zones and the west
sector of Berlin.
The Russians predicate their claims
on similar agreements. which they say
were made at Potsdam and elsewhere.
Mr. LAUSCHE. It is the position of
the Senator from Montana, then. that
the PI'Oblem Is more Involved and far
graver In its possible consequences to
world peace than mere adherence to
those agreements would justify. We
must go beyond that.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
absolutely con-ect, because In my opinion the potentials involved In this situation are teiTible and tremendous.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator.
Mr. MANSFIELD. It does not much
matter now how we got to Berlin. or
why the Russians have no legal right to
ask us to leave. What does matter. Mr.
President. is why we need to stay in Berlin, as stay there -we must. We are,
bluntly, in a highly difficult and dangerous position in Berlin. Great sacrifices
may be entailed in remaining. We had
better understand clearly now the 5ig-
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nificance of maintaining our position
there. We had better understand now
what is vital and what is not vital in that
position to the people of the Uniu:d
States and to freedom.
The administration has responded to
the Ru56ian proposals on Berlin by reiterating a long-standing view of the Nation. It has said, as the Democratic administration before it said, that we will
not be driven from the city. The position of this Government, to stand firm in
Berlin, has been endorsed by the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization. It is supported by Democrats and Republicans
alike In the Senate.
It Is a sound position. Only It is not
enough. It is not enough to say, Mr.
President, that we are standing fast In
Berlin. That is a slogan, not a policy.
Nor Is It enough, Mr. President, to stand
fast merely to demonstrate our determination to maintain our legal Interpretation of the situation as against the
Soviet Union's.
Nor is It enough to say that we stand
fast In Berlin so that we may continue
to demonstrate in the heart of Communist Germany the material superiority of
freedom or free enterprise over Communist collectivism. To be sure, there Is a
striking contrast between West Berlin
and East Berlin, but I doubt very much
that the people of the United States wlll
countenahce the sacrifice of a single human li!e tor the purposes of propagandistic demonstrations In Berlin. And
before this year Is out many lives may
have been spent In Berlin.
No, Mr. President, It Is not for reasons ot legalism or propaganda that we
stand fast in Berlin. The Western nations are in Berlin because Berlin belongs neither to East Germany nor West
Germany: it belongs to all the German
people. We are In Berlin because some
Germans may now look to Bonn and
others to Pankow for leadership, but all
Germans will soon look to Berlin. We
are in Berlin to see to it that when that
city is once a gain the capital of all Germany, as It surely will be. the concept
ot freedom In peace will not be absent
from the scene. If that concept were to
disappear from Berlin, the citadel of
German nationalism. sooner or later it
would disappear from all Germany.
Then, sooner or later. the torch would be
let In Ge1·many, whether by German
hands or some others, to set Europe and
the world aflame once again. That torch
was lit twice In Berlln in the past. and
twice th.e world has paid an enormous
human price. To see that it is not lit
a gain is m the essential. the vital interest of this generation and future generations of the people of the United States.
That. Ml'. President. is the reason
which beyond all others. justifies the
taking of the great risks which we may
soon be called upon to take at Berlin and
along the western routes to the city.
We are in Berlin in order to get out. but
to get out only on condition that the
German political forces which stand for
freedom In peace have a sure footing
and equal chance to sunive and to grow
on their merits in the future capital of
all Germany.
I support fully the position of this administraLion on the ncccss tiy of standmg
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fast in Berlin. I question, however, the
adequacy with which we have related
that position to the changing situation in
Germany. I question a policy which
provides that not only do we stand fast in
Berlin. but also implores or demands that
the Russians stand fast. After years of
trying to get the Russians out of the innumerable places Into which they
swawled after World war II, it is indeed
strange to hear that we are insisting that
the Russians must not, Indeed, cannot,
leave Berlin. That is a most peculial'
position to say the least; and the Russians obviously have no Intention of
obliging us by remaining.
It Is clear what Is afoot there. In a
few months hence. the Russians will
leave East Berlin despite our demands Ol'
urgings to the contrary. East Berlin will
then be. once again, a German cityCommunist, to be sure-but nevertheless
German. By contrast, West Berlin will
retain the appearance It now has, the
appearance of a Western enclave In the
heart of Germany, for there nrc thouaands of Allied officials and military personnel In the area. The contrast will not
be lost on German nationalists In East
or West Germany.
Furthet·, Mr. President, If we are to
hold this enclave without struaale, It will
be at the sufferance of the East Ge1·man
Communist authorities. It they do not
choose to accommcx:latc us, then we shall
In all probability have to fight ou1· way
through to Berlin, not against Russians,
but against Germans. Even If this
course does not lend to a great confilct,
the repercussions In Germany will be
profound. Among Germans, as amon'l
others, blood may prove thicker than
Ideologies.
As I said, there can be no quarrel with
the need to stand fast In Berlin. I do
question. however. a policy which does
not anticipate the developments whtch I
have just outlined and falls to take steps
to miL!gate them.
I question. too. a policy which presumes
as our policy does that the Great Powers
of World War II-the Soviet Umon, the
United Km!!dom. France. and the United
States-can brinl! about German umficaUon. There may have been a time when
such a course was possible. If it ever
existed, however, 1t was yrors ago wheo
Germany lay devastated and prostrate.
It was years llgo. in the frcshne:o;s of the
common sacrifices of World War II and m
the measure of mutual re~pect and tolerance which these sacrifices engendered.
Those years are ~one. The t1mc is not
today. 'Today, there is little respect between this Nation and the Soviet Un1on
except the fearful respect which the military PO\\er of the one may generate in
the other. Today, Germany is nc1ther
devastated nor prostrate: it has become
once again the most dynamic nat1on m
Western Europe.
No. Mr. Prc~<ident. the erstwhile Allies,
the divided Allies of World War II. are
not in a position to ordain a unification
in peace for a revttali7cd Germany. At
most, they may be able to contribute to
that unification by rethinkinP, their own
security needs In anticipatiOn of its Inevitable development. At most. they
may be able to contribute to unification

by exercising such influence as they may
possess to encourage the Germans themselves to reach a reasonable procedure
on unification and by sanctioning that
procedure If It Is sound. It Is the Germans. themselves, however, who will
make the decisive decisions on unification, !! they are to be made in peace.
FR&E

ALL-GER~IAN

ELECTIONS

Further, Mr. President, I question. In
present clrcum~tanccs, a policy which
presumes to lead to the peaceful unification of Germany solely en the basis o!
free, all-German elections. I say now
what I said last May on this point, only
with more cm1:!:as1s. Events have moved
a long way since thl:s policy was devised
and the bell no lonrtcr has an alto('ether
recognizable sound when It Is rung ovct·
and over again In the same fashion. A
G~rmnn political authority has emerged
In the West. Another pollt!cal structure
has appeared In the East which Is
manned by Germans, even It It Is not
directed by them. Whatever we may
think of this structure, there Is no reliable Indication that It Is going to go
away peacefully, o! Its own accord.
There arc now military and paramilitary German forces In both East and
West Germany, How arc these !otces to
be Integrated In peace? Is this a problem that can be solved by free, allGerman elections, at least without extensive preparations by the G:'!rmans who
officer these opposing forces?
There are d!ITerlng economic and social
structures functioning In Western and
Eastern Germany. How arc these structures to be !used In peace? Can they
be harmonized by free, all-German elections, at least without extensive preparations by those Germans who operate
them?
I cite these problems as examples.
There are no doubt others of a similar
nature A policy wh.ch ad\'anccs no
thou r:ht on how they are to be met docs
not ber,in to meet the realities of the
German situation. If the unification of
G ~rmany i:. essential and inevttablc and
if it is neither our responsibility nor in
the Interest of this Nation to seck that
unity by force, then I submit that a policy
which merely clings to an unrealizable
slo~an of free all-German elections,
which docs not pur~ue German unification by other means. I~ no policy at all.
It Is a straitjacket. IL is an excuse for
immobility. It may well lead down the
blind alley of an unnecessary confiici.
or disastrous diplomatic retreat.
Mr. LAUSCHE. 1\lr. President, will
the Senator yll'ld?
l\Ir. MAN!::FIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. I take 1t. from what
the Senator has stated, that the ciTOI'tS
to procure an overall election of citizens
of E.1st and West Germany have thus
far proved to be futile.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is
correct
Mr. LAUSCHE. The East Germans
will not con~ent to have an election under \1 hich their people can give expression to the type of government they
want. Based upon the fact that that
objective is an unre:altzable objective. an
overall free election, the Senator from
Montana sugcests that other means
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should be explored to procure a solution
of the problem. I wish the Senator
would comment on that point.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I believe that the
position of the Western Powers on the
question of all-German elections Is one
which stands no possibility In the Immediate future, and perhaps In the indefinite future, of achieving any degree of
success. Therefore we should try to
work out othor means.
As I shall Indicate In the course of
my speech, there are contacts In existence between the East German Government and the West German Government. 'These contacts are made on an
interzonal basis, and are tied up with
commercial Intercourse and trade commttments. I would hope that In considering the Idea o! elections, we might
be able to explore, perhaps, Ideas other
than all-German elections, even though
they arc the most desirable, and I should
like to see them come to pass, and we
might try to break It down-and the
sooner the better-so that the East Germans could express themselves at the
polls, perhaps just In East Germany,
and declare to the world where they
want to go. In that way they might get
out from under the yoke the Ulbricht
government, which Is exercising despotic
and complete control over 17 m1ll!on
Germans In East Germany.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The Senator from
Montana clarifies my mind on the subject. In other words, all o! us want a
!ree election under which the people
themselves would decide the type of government they de~ire to have.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Absolutely.
Mr. LAUSCHE. However, every effort In that direction has been rebutTed,
and it Is therefore necessary to find other
means of tryint:: to reach an agreement.
Mr. MANSF.ELD. That Is the idea.
The Senator Is correct. Every effort to
achieve an all-German election has
failed because of the Insistent and dogmatic "nyet" af the S:>viet Union.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. SPi\RKMAN. Do I understand
correctly the position of the Senator
from ;>vtontana to be that, while he adheres to what we have advocated so
lonf1' that is. free elections for all of
Gcrmarly, :>nd the idea of a unified Germany, he recognizes the very practical
difficulty of having that under present
conditions? Therefore he says that perhaps we ou~ht to make ourselves more
flexible and st:~rt exploring some other
way, and that there might be held a
separate election in East Germany ·1d
a sC'paratc election in West Germ~toy,
and thus perhaps there could be agreement upon some kind of independent
government in each of the two areas,
wtth the Idea that eventually, as he says,
because blood is thicker than water, with
teamwork the two temporary Germanys
will combine themselves Into one overall
united Germany some time in the future,
even though we know not how far in
the future.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The purpose of my
speech today Is to suggest, respectfully
and constructively, some possible altern-
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atlve which may be of value to the De·
partment of State, or out of which may
come Ideas which would be worthwhile
toward the bringing about of a solution
to this most dl.ftlcult problem.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I should like to
propound a question to the Senator !rom
Montana. He spoke about the rigidity
of our position In the past. Undoubtedly
It has been rather rigid, so rigid that
perhaps our country, as well as a great
part or the world, was rather shocked
recently when Secretary Dulles sunested
there might be more tlexlblllty than we
have given to the Idea, and whe~ he
suggested there might be methods other
than free elections for the solution of
the problem. Is It not true, and would
not the Senator aaree with me In this,
that perhaps we have overslmplltled the
matter In assumlna that a reunification
could be easily brouaht about betweell
the two Germanys?
I may say that about 3 years ago I had
the pleasure or attending an International conference at Garmlsch In Ger·
many, The conference was made up or
people from all the NATO countries, rep·
resentatlves of governments, ot!lclals,
buslneM people, economists, members of
Parliament, and so on, and one of the
German Ministers with whom I had quite
a long talk made the point to me, the
drst time I had ever heard It mentioned,
that reun11lcatlon Is not a simple mat.
ter. A1s hu been pointed out by the
Senator from Montana. It might have
been a relatively simple matter several
years ago, ri ght after the war. But
since that time the two Germanles have
grown away from the condition:! which
the Senator has so well de.<;crlbed In h1s
speech. They have grown away from
some of the Incentives which might have
pushed them together.
Furthermore. dl.trerent enactments
have taken place. For Instance. the
Minister of the Bonn government said
to me, "This may sound strange, comIng from me, but East Germany has a
social security system which In many
respects Is better than ours."
Mr. MANSFIELD. I t also antedates
our own.
Mr. SPARKMAN. Yes. Although I
was speaking of the social secunty of
West Germany, It Is also true that the1rs
antedates ours, too.
East Germany has a system which Is
1n many respects better than that In
West Germany, so the East Germans
could not be asked to give up their system of social security, workmen·s compensation, and land reform.
The Senator !rom Montana, I believe.
heard me ask the mayor of West Berlin
the other daY. that very question, and he
heard the mayor's comments. to the er•
feet that to bring the two Germanles
together, whenever It may be done, will
necessitate the resolving of differences
and the makln~; of allowances between
the two governments. As I understand,
that Is exactly what the Senator is talkIng about. He Is speaking of the necessity on the part of those concerned to
be ready to consider and to negotlate
with reference to all the changes which
have taken place throughout the years.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator Is cor·
rect.

Mr. SPARKMAN. I commend the
Senator from Montana for making this
very able speech and calling to our attention a matter which l8 not only of tremendous Importance but also of great
timeliness. After all, the ultimatum wlll
expire on May 28, which Is not far oft.
It has been suggested since the ultimatum was made that perhaps there will
not be absolute adherence to that exact
date. Nevertheless, we are approaching
the day when Russia will leave Berlin.
I think the Senator Is correct In saying
that. Russia will leave, and that the
United States will be placed In a rather
ridiculous position It we try to keep Russia there, when, as a matter of fact, we
have been saying to the world for many
years that she should get out of the
dlt'terent countries which she occupies.
Mr . MANSFIELD. A1s a matter of
fact, the Soviet Union has already withdrawn some of Its troops and a considerable number of the dependents of those
troops. So It does not appear that Russia was fooling. when It delivered Its ultimatum. I hope that the United States
will do, as I feel certain we are doing,
everything possible to develop alterna·
tlves and to consider ways and means
to meet the situation. It and when It
arises, when the deadline occurs, as the
Senator from Alabama has pointed out,
on May 27.
Mr. SPARKMAN. I think the Senator
from Montana Is exactly correct. Cer.
talnly we should be exploring all the
alternatives. I think the Senator will
a gree with me that we ought not simply,
easily, and QUickly reject any proposal
wh1ch Is made, but. that we should be
willing to let the world know that we are
Willing to sit dov:n and negotiate concerning every proposal which may come
from either side.
Mr. .MANSFIELD. Yes. I hope both
the Soviet Union and the United Stal<'s
will get away from the automatic reactions of the proposals which one country makes to the other. Usually the
answer Is an automatiC ··No" Once In
a while a "maybe" or a. "perhaps" and
occasionally a. "yes" would be useful. I
think In that way we m!Rht begin, at
least on the marginal level, to do away
with some of the differences. If we can
do that, perhaps we can work our wny
upward to an eventual solution or the
bl~ger problems.
Mr. LAUSCHE. Mr. President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. LAUSCHE. The other day, In the
talk with the mayor of West Berlin, I
v·'\S greatly encouraged by his rea!;onauleness In wantmR to explore every
avenue which m 1ght lend us out or dark·
ness into the li11ht and to an assured
pe-ace for those people. May I ask the
Senator from Montana If he has !liven
any consideratiOn to the ability or the
Soviet Union, after It has once withdrawn Its troops, to jump In again because or Its closeness to this area or
East Berlin?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I have, Indeed. It
the Senator will bear with me, I shall
discuss that subject brlefty when I come
to the ninth point In my recommendation.
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Mr. LAUSCHE. I thank the Senator
from Montana.
JJ.Ill.ITARY WITHDRAWAL IN CERMANY AND
CENTRAL EVIIOP£

Mr. MANSFIELD. Finally, Mr. Pres!·
dent, I question a policy which appears
to regard as sacrosanct present military
arrangements in Germany and Central
Europe. I can understand, I can accept,
I can support the concept that Western
Germany's ties with Western Europe are
essential to the peace of Europe and they
must not be broken. Within that concept, however, I cannot comprehend a
view which seems to hold tnnexlbly to
the present form and extent of German
rearmament. We have accepted and
even encouraged rises In the German
military contribution to NATO In certain
circumstances In the past. I do not see
that we can.lot accept and encourage
decllne,s In that contribution In other
circumstances In the future.
Security needs are ever-changlnr
needs. Western German rearmament Is
not an end In Itself. It Is for the pur·
pose o! the defense of German freedom
In common with the defense o! the freedom of the Western community. It Is
not for the purpose of keeping rigid the
tables of organization and the projections of presumed needs by the military
command of NATO. The6e projections,
In any event, ha.ve not been met for
years and the world has not yet come to
an end.
The nature and extent o! German rearmament and of non-German armaments on German soil, In short, is one
area or the problem of umncation in
which reasonable proposals for negotia·
tlon. wherever they may origmate,
oucht not to be rejected out of h:t'hd.
That Is especially the case if these proposals are related to the reduction of
military power throughOut Central
Europe. I know full well that the Russians may have no intention of withdrawing from the Eastern European
Stales m any circumstances. Neverthele!;S, I can see no reason to make It
easier for them to justify their remainIng by a seeming intransigence on our
part. I cannot see that the road to the
evE'ntual freedom of states like Poland
and Czechoslovakia is made easier by
such n process.
IWSSIAN ROL£ IN TlU: COMINC CRISIS

Mr. President, let me turn now to the
que!:tlon of Russian intentions in the
commg crisis In Germany. In this matl<'r there is only one certain course.
Whatever they may do. we must assume
that the Russians are acting to enhance
the pos1t1on of the Soviet Union and that
of totalitarian communism throughout
Germany and Europe. We must also assume that they w1ll use wha tever methods they believe will lead to these ends,
not excluding l\((IUessive war. The RusSians may blow hot or they may blow
cold. They may down a plane on their
border one dny. They may release a
blocked convoy the next. We cannot
know with certainty why they act as they
act a.t. any given moment.
We cannot know w1th certainty the
purport of Mr. M1koyan·s recent visit to
the United States. We cannot know with
C<'r talnty the meaning of Mr. Khru·
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shchev's comments on a thaw In the cold
war. They m..ny be meant to provide a
~ett1ng for successful ne1totlat1ons. They
may be meant simply to confuse or beguile.
I! they do confuse. I! they do beguile,
however, we shall have no one to blame
but ourselves. We ought to be able by
this time. years after the 111-!ated Geneva Conference of 1955, to dlstlneulsh
between the conciliatory eesture and the
act of conciliation. Those of us who
come from the cold country have learned
throueh bitter experience that winter
thaws can be followed by summer frosts.
The promise of sprlne In February Is not
t he same as the comlne of spring In May.
There Is, as I say, no way of knowing
with certainty what some particular Soviet eesture or other slenlt\es. What we
can know, Mr. President, Is that they are
all, JOOd or bad, peripheral to the crisis
which Is comlne In Germany. Mr. Mlll:oyan'a vlalt Ia not JOin&" to free ua from
that crisis. Mr. Khrushchev's thaws wUI
not do it. I ncreased Soviet-American
t rade has little 1·e1at1on to lt.
It we are to be prepared to face this
erlsla In Germany It will be best not to
become distracted or obsessed by the
twists and turns of Soviet behavior. It
•·Ill be best to keep our eyes on Germany
The fundamental question of policy for
ua Is not so much v•hat the Russians are
looklnlr for In Germany. We know what
they are looklne for: and they may very
well seize It \\hlle v•e amuse or fascinate
ourselves by trylne to Interpret the
charades of Russian behavior.
No, Mr. President: more Important, far
more Important, to us Is to lcnow what
we ourselves are seeklnJ In Germany,
We must bring to this crisis not only
courage, but also conviction. We must
bring to It a posltl\'e and understandable
policy which meets our essential national
needs and the essential needs o! freedom.
nu

ESSZ:NTlAUI

or A WlCSH11N POLICY IN TJlC
COMI!<O ClliSIS

As I noted earlier In my remarks. It
Is not !or Lhe Senate to direct the President and the Secretary of Stat.c In the
conduct of the forei gn relations of the
United Stales. Dut il Is a responsibility
of Senators to try to contribute constructively-and I whh to repeat the
word •·construcllvely"-Lo the policle~
which govern those relations. It Is m
that sense, Mr. President, that I seck, In
these final comml'nts, to express the
thought~ which this exploration suggest.s-thOU"hts on the essentials or a
sound We~tern policy !or the coming
crisis In Germany. I have no crystal
ball. I have no Se<'ret mformatlon. I
have not been coach<'d by anyone. nor
have I been a•ked by anyone to deliver
this speech. What I suggest may not be
valid In the light of the greater understanding of others. It Is one Senator's
v1ews, based upon what he has rend,
what he has h<'ard, what he has tried to
reason . H is, In short, the course which
su"gests Itself to me on the basis of the
understanding which I have been able to
draw out o! the confusion and complexIty of the German situation. I can beand may well be-wrong: and I stand
ready to accept a better Illumination of
the problem through discussion and de-

bate In t h e Senate. For whatever they
may be worth, however, I outline the following points as essentials of e. sound.
w estern policy on Germany.
First. It Is essential, Mr. President.
that forces representing the concept of
freedom In peace not be driven out or
Berlin. They need, at the least, to remain on a basis of equality with the
forces of totalitarian communism In the
future capital of Germany, It those
forces are to have a chance to remain in
peace, a western Initiative for peace Is
essential.
Second. It is time to call upon German
leaders of the two Berlin communities-East and West-to begin serious etforts to
unify t he municipal eovernment and
public services of that city.
Third. To that end, Mr. President, It
would be help!ul to enlist the conciliatory services of the Secretary General
of the United Natlon.t. It aereement
can be reached by East Germany and
West Germany to establish an all-Berlin
government, then It will be desirable to
replace both Soviet and Allied forces
with a United Nations Interim pollee
force composed of contlneents !rom nations not directly ln\'olved. That force
mleht aupervl!e the aereement, and
mleht see to It that all the routes of
access to the city remain open until Berlin once aealn becomes the capltnl of a.
peaceful, unlfled Germany. It may be
that In the B:!rlin microcosm there may
evolve patterns of unification which will
be applicable to the laree1· problem of
all-German unlf\catlon.
Fourth I! this approach or some such
approach to a unified. neutrnU7ed ~rlln
falls, Mr. President, then it Is eEsentlal
that the forces representing the concept
of freedom in peace In Berlin remnln In
Berlin, regardless o! whether the Russians leave. Let them go, I! they will. I
would not wish to see this country a party
to any Insistence that they stay.
Fifth. At the same time. however, the
forces representing freedom In Berlin
must be Germanized liS rapidly liS posSible. It ls time to think seriously of
replacing the thousands or allied military personnel In Berlin with German
m1ht1a, fully support.cd by NATO guarantees.
Sixth. Some mny regard discussions
between Germans of the West nnd Germans of the Ea ~t as tantamount to recognition of the East German Communist
regime. Some who re~~:ard a.:. appeasement not only talk, but even thou ht,
which apparently Is allen to them, on the
senous problems of the Nat1on, may e\'en
go so far as to label with this stamp of
political chicanery any propo~al. of
meetmgs between East and West G rmans. Let them do it, Mr. Pre•ldcnt, It
Is their privileGe.
But let me say this: U talk constitutes
recognition or appeasement, then we
have appeased and reco~nized Communist China, because a representative of
this Government has been talking on Its
behalf, on and orr. for years, w1th a Chinese Communist representative In Geneva and WarSI\w. If talk constltut.('S
recognition or appeasement, then the
West Germans have recognl?.ed and appeased Pankow for years. The fact l.s
that East Gcl'mans and West Gctmans
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have worked out pr actical agreements of
various kinds between the two zones of
Germany. A1; early as 1957, West Germany's exports to East Germany fot the
year totaled $201 million. During the
first half or 1958, $125 mllllon in trade
moved In each direction. That kind of
trade, Mr. President, does not take place
without talk.
I do not know what the theory of
lntematlonal la.w may be. I do not
know whether talk Is tantamount to recoenltlon. I do know that, as a practical
matter, we have talked with, but have
not recognized, Ccmmunlst China.. West
Germans have talked with and traded
with, but have not recognized, Pankow.
What Is Involved in the coming crisis in
Germany Is not a classroom problem on
the theory of International law. It Is
the life or death problem of peace or
war. The stake Is the lives of tens of
millions of humo.n beings, Americans
included.
I ce.nnot see that there Is going to be
any peaceful solution of this problem
without a ereat deal of talk-between
Germans who are in authority in the
Federal Republic and Germana who purport to be In authority In the Eastern
zone. It aeerrus to me essential, moreover. that this talk cover the whole range
or problems of unification or the two
zones, the whole range of problems Involving the nllrmonizlng of the political,
economic, and milltary systems of the
two zones.
Seventh. There Is a point beyond
\\'hlch the search for peace can lead to
the Jeopardizing of freedcm. Regardl~><~s of whlltever agreements emerge, it
seems to me essential that the people or
East Germany have ~orne genuine choice
In the form of control which Is exercised.
over them. There must be provision for
the protect!nn of the rights or all peaceful political forces In aU Germany. AllGerman elections ma.y not bt.. essentialalthough I think them highly desirablebut at least there must be a chance for
men and women of Eastern Germany, as
well as those of Western Germany, to express themselves and their political preferences and to participate In political
n.Oalrs without the threat of terror.
Whatever may be the details of the
fusion of the two zones, they are best
left to the G:!rmans of the two zones.
The Gcrm..nns are likely to know better
th:m anyone else what will suit them and
what L~ possible among them. Furthermore. It is Inconceivable that at this late
dat.c the erstwhile allies of World War II
can work out these details on the1r
behalf.
Eighth. The contribution which the
Westem allies, as well as the Soviet
Un1on, need to make, lf there is to be
pen.ce. Is to guarantee, for a period of
tlmc. the kind of unified Germany which
m..ny emerge from discll!:sions among the
G~rmans. What the former allies need
to do Is to see to It that a unified Germany neither 1s subjected to military
pressures from its neighbors, nor becomes a source of military pressure to
its nelrthbors.
Ninth. To th11t end, Mr. President, it
Is essential to Include within the scope
o! ow· policy the search for agreements
which, while they clo not compel a sever-
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ance of West Germany's nwnerous ties
with western Europe, may lead to limitations of armaments throughout Germany a.nd central Europe. Also needed
are agreements which will pull back the
so-called ultimate weapons and the
armed forces of both East a.nd West
from the points of imminent contact In
Germany and In central Europe. In
short, Mr. President, it seems to me
essential that our policy, NATO's policies, do not exclude a careful consideration of the Rapackl Plan, the Eden Plan
tor a demilitarized zone In middle
Europe, or similar proposals In connection with the unification of Germany.
Perhaps the best way to consider these
matters would be to predicate them'on
reasonable agreements which may
emerge from the Geneva Conferences on
Surprise Attacks and the Suspension of
Nuclear Tests.
Nqw getting back to what thP. distlngul.shed senior Senator !rom Ohio [Mr.
LAuscH£] mentioned a while ago. he
a.sked, I believe, If I recognized the signl.ftcance of a pullback :md how It would
benefit the Soviet Union. I do reco~nize
that In some kinds of pullback the Westem Powers would receive the worst of
it, but I think we ought to recognize
also that 1! there Is to be any possib1llty
of peace, we shall have to make some
concessions; this might be one or them.
We need to recognize that In so doing, It
a withdrawal based on a reasonable
solution were brought about, we woUld
be the ones who would take a loss In
position, since the Soviet divisions, In going ba.ck to the heartltmd, would be in
striking distance and would be better
prepared than we would be to carry on
any m!Utnl"}' activity In that area. Dut
we have to develop give and tnke.t by
starting from the r>ottom and wor~lng
upward. If we do not get out or the
position or rigidity, I b~lleve the situation In Berlin and In Germany w!ll become worse. and the bases on which
there «tP,n be peace will become fewer
and r\!wer
Mrr LA', SCH:e. Mr President, will
the Senator yield?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield to the Senator from Ohio.
Mr. LAUSCHE I agree with the
statement of the. Scnntor. In my opinIon, there is a conditiOn existing tn
which, 1t the Soviet ~vernment continues to dictate to the govemmint of
East Berlin. It will be Impossible to bring
about a reconciliation of E.'lSt and West
Berlin. Sov1et Russia w11l not tolerate
it. Ba.sed upon the adamant pos1tion
of Soviet Russia. and ba.~ed upon the
rigiditY of the s1tuallon as descnbed by
the Senator from Montana, while the
matters about which I have ~poken are
highly desirable, I Soiree we should look
for other avenues to e~cape the great
holocaust which seems to be threatening us In the future. I. for one-and I
believe conlinnatlon has been given t<>
this view by the mayor or West Berlinwould want every avenue explored, talks
hud, continued talks, In the hope that
1i0me solution may be found.
Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator 1.s
correct.
No.24--6

Mr. President, I have taken a great
deal o! the Senate's time today. I have
tried not to take It lightly. I have done
so because it Is clear ·that this administration, following the example of Its predecessor, has committed the Nation. to
stand fast at Berlin.
It Is a resolve well taken. Since we
cannot yet perceive to what extremity
of sacrifice It may lead In the months
ahead, I have felt It essential to try
to set forth for the consideration of the
Senate my understandin~ of what Is Involved In the coming crisis In Germany.
I am grateful that in this crucial time
the Senate's pricipal member In these
matters, the outstanding Senator from
Arkansas !Mr. FuLaRICHT) Is a man with
such a deep understanding and intelligent grasp o! the international forces
that play on the Nation. I hope that he
will make his voice heard: I am sure
that the President and the Secretary o!
State will listen most carefully. I
would hope, further, that between them
will evolve a policy that all of us, as
Americans, will be glad to support.
Most important, Mr. President, I hope
that the President of the United States,
his Secretary of State, and the Congress
will fortify the resolve to stand fast in
Berlin with the conviction v. hlch only
a positive policy for peace can g1ve 1t.
The Secretary o! State ha.s spoken or
mutual concessions. Those are calm and
wise words for this moment m t1mc. with
the clouds of radioactive death waiting
to envelope the earth. I hope, deeply,
that they w1ll lead to n pos1t!ve policy
for peace. It is th~t kind of a policy
for wh1ch rational men everywhere arc
wa1tmg. It IS that kmd of a policy
wh1ch they w1ll be able to compr(·hend
and to which. lf need tx-. tht'Y w11l be
able w1Umgly to consecrate their lives.
The policy has yet to be formed. It
needs to be formed soon. If It is
formed, the concept of freedom in peace
will not perish in Berlin, m Germany,
or in the world.
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. Mr. President, will the Senator y1eld?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I yield.
Mr. JOHNSON of Texas. It has been
a treat to be privileged to hear an excellent speech, such as a the one which
has just been concluded by a great man.
The distinguished Senator from Montana has made many contnbut1ons to
the cause of peace In the world, but
none more important than hi!! forceful
statement today. Alw1n·s responsible.
alwars constructive, we his collem:ues in
the Senate talte great pride m scrvmG
w1th him.
On behalt of the State l':hlch 1 represent. I w1sh to say to the State from
which he comes that the world 1s n better world because of Milt£ M,.:-;SFIF.LD,
and that the suggestions he has made
today, predicated upon the great philosophy of Isaiah's advice, "Come now,
let us reason together," should be heard
around the world.
I thank the Senator for his constructive contribution. I feel very humble
to be able to sit In his pre~ence.
Mr. MANSFIELD. I thank the distinguished Senator from Texas.
Mr. President. I yield the noor.
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Mr. WILEY. Mr. President, I was
given a copy of the fine address which
the distinguished Senator from Montana delivered today. I read It, and I
have heard part of the address today.
I agree very much with the very fine
encomium paid by the distinguished majority leader to the S~nator from Montana. As many folks have said, "MIKE
M":-osnELo is a real guy." I agree with
that statement.
I can a~rec with much the Senator
from Montana has stated. I particularly agree about the need for us In this
Chamber to discuss responsibly and constructively not only foreign policies but
also all measures in that manner. Full
and free debate was and is an essential
element of a bipartisan approach.
I wish to say to the very able Senator,
there Is no need for the Senator to re assure the Senate regarding his serious
purpose and his careful choice of words.
I and my colleagues on this side of the
aisle always are conildent the Senator
will give sober, Intelligent and constructive addresses on any subject, foreign
policy or anything else. He is "that sort
ot guy," as someone has said. The Senator has set high standards for himseH,
and I congratulate him.
I should like to record my agreement
with the Senator concerning the seriousness of the Berlin situation and the need
for all of us to maintain open minds :md
the utmost of fiexib1l.ty, in considerir.g
possible avenues for a possible resolu tion
of the problem, in accord with the free
world mterest. Indeed. I think we have
ben g1ven a sound account of the background of t he situation in Germany. as
well as a number of clucs-I hesitate to
call them all essentials-to\,ard fimling
the peaceful solution we seek.
liO\\ ever. I should also like to state my
behef that at least two main elcm·'nts
m the current G~rman scene have been
barely mentioned in my colleague's notable speech.
The first missing ingredient concerns
the past and continuing requirement
that the United States consult with and
move In concert with its allies, espec1ally
f'rnnce, Great Britain, and West Germany. There is no question that the
Sov1et Union, acting only In Its own interests. in the very nature of thin~~:s has
been able to represent itself as ostens!bly
more flexible than the West in propaganda and diplomatic approaches to
central European problems.
We must remember that the We ,t
German Government itself has been a
foremost exponent of firmness in dealin~
with the U.S S.R. This point gains in
Importance when v.·e recall the re:narks
made by the Senator about the unific:~
Uon question bem!1! one for action by the
Germans themselves.
\Ve know who holds the strings in Ea~t
Germany. We know who ccntro!s r:~.st
Germany \!\'e mi ght as well look that
fact in the face. They not only control
E<\St Germany, but they also control
CZechoslovakia, Bul ~aria, Romania. and
all the Baltic States. It is not a question ot the F.ast Germans and the West
Germans getting together.

2042

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE
leadership will be the best guarantee that
fiexlblllty Ia not fiabblness and that a strong
and tough hand Ia In charge. The Russians
will make no dangerous mistakes while he Is
there. and our allies will be much less apprehensive.
There Is one question which, If we knew
the answer to It, would light up the whole
situation. Why Is It that Moscow has opened
up Berlin and the German queetlon now
rather than, let us say, 2 years hence? The
Russians know quite well that German opinIon Ia evolving. and that Dr. Adenauer's refusal to negotiate on a realistic basis will not
be held to by h1s successors. In 2 years, Mr.
Dulles will be out or omce, and until very
recently there was no difference between his
position and Or. Adenauer's. In 2 years,
moreover. there will b&--1! the Russians believe what Senator SYMINGTON and others
say-a marked shift In the beJance ot power.
Why, then, are they In such a. burry now?
My own guess, which rests only on hints and
Inferences. Is that they regard the position
In Eastern Germany, and perhaps also In
Eastern Europe, as precarious and potentially
explosive. They are deeply concerned, aa
everyone knows. about West Oerman rearmament, which will have been a.chleved In
about 2 years. Why are they so concerned
about It when they tbernaelvea have a very
much bigger army anc1 are al.ao themselves
a first-class nuclear power? When I asked
some of the people I aaw In Moscow why they
worried so much about West Oerman rearmament when they could annihilate West Germany with their lntermec11ate-ra.nge ml.eallee
the stock answer waa that they feared an
armed Germany backec1 by the United States.
But 1 do not think that thla Ia the whole
explanatton of thelr fear, or, rather, I do
not think that It spells out the nature ot
their !ear. My guess Is that they have no
Illusions about the c11scontent of the East
Oermans, and that what they feu Ia that
the East Germans, when they ace a. strong
West German army less than 2 hours away,
may be aorely t.empted to atart e.n uprlalng
In cahoots with omcera ot the West German
army. It that happened, the !at would be
In the nrc and both the United States and
the U.S.S.R. would be Involved.
Something of this sort Ia, I !eel sure, the
cfux or the German problem todny. There
Is an ever-present and growing danger of
revolt In Eastern Europe which would entail
Soviet Intervention In the Hungarian manner and would unavoidably bring about a
great war The RuS$Ians are undoubtedly
worried about this, and truly responsible
men In all the Western capitals are equnlly
worried about lt. Only those who have more
emotion than they have Imagination anc1
foresight take the view that nn Enst European uprising woulc1 be wonderful and just
what the free world wants.
It Is the Impending danger In Eastern
Europe which makes It Imperative to move
toward German negotiations. For the best,
and perhaps the only. way to avert the c1anger Is to move toward the beginnings or the
reunlncntlon ot the two Germanys. We
$hould make the Kremlin understand that
we approach the coming negotiations. not
with Intent to provoke an uprising Ill Eastern
Europe. but In order to find. an alternative to lt.
The Russian problem In Germany anc1 Europe Is not how to conquer and absorb Western Europe. This Is away beyond. anything
that Is within their reach. The Russian
problem Is how they can disengage themselves In Eastern Europe without jeopardizIng their own security. How can the satellites become, not their violent enemies. but
neutrals? At bottom the problem Ia bow to
let go without falling otr and being run over.
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made. The senator places great em~
phasls on the fact that ultimate unification of Germany is inevitable, and that
we should have recognized it and should
have done more about it.
Exactly what should we have done?
When we are faced against the Kremlin, which has taken 500 million human
beings Into its orbit, and when the
United States has..placed, as it were, its
Iron curtain against the approach onto
West Germany and onto France and the
Lowlands-what should we have done?
Let us consider. The fact is that the
Inevitability of the ultimate reunification of Germany has been recognized by
the Western countries since the end of
World War II. That has been common
talk. Germany has to be brought toFether. Uniftcation has to come.
We have not only recognized that !act,
but we have also recognized that a divided Germany constitutes a serious
threat to the peace. Willy Brandt was
quoted by the newspapers yesterday,
after he had had a. talk with the ~est
dent, as saying that definitely the President said we are not going out of Berlln. We are sticking. We are there
with the purposes we have always had.
That, in substance, was the remark.
We have not oniy recognized this fact,
but we have recognized that a divided
Germany constitutes a threat to the
peace. Both the Republican and Democratic administrations since 1945 and
1946 have made unrelenting efforts to
bring the four zones together. I remember the etTorts which have been
made time after time.
We actually got an agreement at the
Geneva Conference in 1955 for a reunification of Germany and for free
elections. What happened? Of course,
the Russians broke the agreement wide
open. The Russians reneged on the
agreement. All of the subsequent efforts to achieve reunification, including
the notes we sent last fall, have failed.
We have been working at this a. long
time.
I desire to give credit where credit Is
due. I do not care to say simply that
we are at fault if we cannot get a. government to reason with us and to work
with us. That is what has happened, so
far as the Kremlin Is concerned, but we
have been on the job.
As I have said, in Geneva we obtained
an agreement for free elections. Who
pushed that agreement? We did. AfterMR . Dtn.Lr.s Is ND:Im)
ward It went out the window. The reaThere Ia no reason to doubt that John
son the West Germans have been reFoster Dullea will onco again come out on
butTed is that the Soviets have been untop. carrlec1 through hla ordeal not only by
his stamina, which Ia fabulous. but also by
willing t'o agree to any plan of reunificathe knowlec1ge that he Ia at Ul.ls moment the
tion which would not guarantee the
lndl.&pensable man. There have been times
bolshevism of Western Germany and its
In the past when thlnga were at the end or
annexation to Eastern Germany.
a chapter. and he could with gr~>Ce and digThis Is not the first time in world t.: nity have made way tor a younger ml!n. But
tory that we have been unable to obtain
not just now. This Ia a periOd when thlllgs
agreements that were valid, and that
are moving toward a climax. after which the
world may be very diO'oroot, and. he, blmael!,
would be kept by the other party. Out of
Is at the climax or his career.
52 agreements we made with the KremThere Ia no one else In the Western World
lin, the Kremlin broke 50 of them. That
who has authority. comparable with his, to
Is the situation we are meeting. We must
lead tho enormously compleK negotiations
recognize the simple fact that the Soviets
about Germany and about Europe which In.
have a clutch hold on Eastern Germany.
one way or another are now unavoidable and.
Mr. WU..EY. Mr. President, I have The Germans are not free. They are
Imperative. I! the West moves. aa It must.
!rom a policy of standing pat, to one or gone over these points which the dis- running out-400 a day, according lo
negotiation and compromJse, hla perb<lnal tinguished Senator from Montana has Willy Brandt. When we look that fact

We were told the other day by Willy
Brandt, a statesman, which was confirmed to me personally by Mr. Adenaur, that If the East Germans had their
own way 95 percent of them would join
with the West.
In fact, I could not help feeling that
the address of my distinguished colleague
had a slight tone in It which was hard
to under6tand. The Senator seemed to
alternate back and forth between giving
us and the Germans primary responsibility for taking the initiative. I do not
complain. for this is a natural consequence of the great complexity of the
issues at stake. More Important, I do
not complain of any sacrlf.ce of flexibility which may be inherent In our need
to act In agreement with our allles, for
I am certain that we can all agree the
Western alliance Is the cornerstone of
the free world security.
The second missing ingredient, in my
view, Is the lack of recognition accorded
to the efforts of our Government and to
the etTorts of our allles over the years,
to say nothing of the recent concentrated
work over the past weeks and months,
toward finding ways to negotiate this
extremely serious problem. In !act, the
headlines this morning contain news of
western willlngness to widen the scope
of envisaged negotiations, which confirms the activities of Mr. Dulles and his
European counterparts. Clearly, our
policy has not put us In a straitjacket.
I think It is also clear that my colleague has, in the fashion of Don Qulxote,
been doing a little tllUng at a. stone wall,
and that stone wall ls tbe Kremlin, not
the East Germans.
Despite these few difficulties I have
encountered so far, I thank the distinguished Senator from Montana. In all
seriousness. for a highly illuminating
presentation of the crux of the Berlin
problem. I am not prepared to comment
in depth on his use!ul address. because
I have not had time for that. However,
as frequently happens, Mr. Walter Lippmann's column of ti1is mornmg contains
some thoughts v.•hlch I consider extremely pertinent to this subject. so I
ask unanimous conli,ent that there may
be pnnted at this point in my discussion
the comments of Walter Lippmann in his
article of this morning.
There being no objection, the article
was ordered to be printed in the Rr:coao,
as follows:
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in the face, we begin to realize what the
trouble is.
The Senator from Montana suggests
that the way to work toward reunification would be to start by having the West
G 2rmans and the East Germans talk
among themselves and att~mpt to ne~o
t!ate the unification ot the two divisions
o! Berlin. I heard that talk on the floor
today. That Is a consummation devoutly
to be wished, but we cannot make an
agreement with the slave when the master pas the slave under his thumb. That
is the situation. We might as well recognize lt. That Is what we have been tryIng to break down. It the master were to
allow the slave freedom to work out his
own salvation, 96 percent of the East
Germans would vote for reunification.
It Is dltllcult to see how the attempt to
work out reunification could be any more
successful than our past e!Torts with the
Russians. We have tried to get the Russians to agree. The East Germaru are
not free to negotiate on their own. That
Is t he big point. They are controlled by
the Russians. and therefore they would
continue to retlect the Russian control.
In eiTect, the Senator Is saying In his
speech that the West Germans should be
more tlexlble; they should enter l!Uo
negotiations with the East Germans.
This Is something that the West German
Government, up to date, has refused to
do. The West German Government is
an Independent nation It claims that
East Germany Is a part of Germany.
The contention is made that the United
States can make the West Germans
change their position and become more
:ftexlble.
Mr. MANSFIELD Mr President. will
the Senator yield?
Mr. WILEY. Let me tlnlsh this paragraph.
The fact Is that West Germany Is a
proud and powerful ally of the United
States. As an allY. It has a mind o! Its
own. and we cannot dictate to it. as the
Russians are dictating to the East Germans. The West Germans are the ablest
people In Europe. They know the situation: and when they take the posillon
they have taken. they take It with their
eyes OJX'n. The-y realize that they are
under the thumb or the Ru!>~ian s. or the
East Germ:til$. and they realize that they
cannot t'vcn ncRotHite with the people
who are the serfs.
I now yield to the Senator from
Montana.
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President. I believe that there should be called to the
~nator's attC'ntlon the !act that rt'latlonshlps ex1st at. the present time betwee-n the F..ast. German Government and
the West German Go~rnmt'nt. Such
relationships have existed for somt'
years. Those relationships arc based
upon Interzonal agreements. The result. is that trade amounting to hundred-;
o! millions of dollar. is generated between the two arc;,.,.
The Senator aho makes the point that
I 1.ecm to be advocatmg an Amcncan
Initiative. What I have been trying to
advocate Is a western mlliatlve. including all the allies, and lncludmg West
Germany. I do not think we can maintam a pctnfled policy. because we know

that there Is no prospect of going forward on that basis.
We are facing a deadline, May 27. 1959,
at which time the Soviet Union has Indicated it will have all Its troops and dependent personnel withdrawn from the
eastern sector of the city. I think we
must come up with something In the way
of alternatives. I was very pleased when
Secretary Dulles came back and said
that he would be willing to consider concessions on a quid pro quo basis. I was
delighted with the degree of succe~s the
Secretary had achieved among our allies,
Dr. Adenauer, General DeGaulle, and
Prime Minister Macmillan.
So I do not quite get the point the distinguished Senator from Wisconsin has
In mind, because. as I recall the speech
I made, there seems to be very little
dlt:rerence between us.
I expressed the hope that those In the
State Department would give some consideration to the speech made today, not
because of any personal Interest I have
In It, but because of the fact that some
suggestions arc belna made, and perhaps
out of those suggestions, or others which
may be generated, will come a degree of
success In meeting the dlmcultles which
confront us In the German and Berlin
situation. and out of which, perhaps, may
come unification of the two Berllns and
the two Germa11ys at an earlier date
than any of us can anticipate at the
moment.
I thank the Senator for yielding to me
and giving me an opportunity to answer
him In part.
Mr. \VILEY. Did the Senator wish to
address anv particular question to me?
In what direction did he desire to direct
my thought?
Mr. MANSFIELD. I wished to bring
to the attention of the Senator the fact
that I understood him to say that I was
advocating American !nlnatlvc. I was
advocating Western Initiative, "~~•hlch
would include all Allied Powers, and also
Dr Adenauer.
Mr. WILEY. I do not ~hlnk we are
very far apart.
The only thing I disagree with Is the
Implication that there has bct'n no
initiative. In my opinion the executive
department, \\hose funcl!on It Is to
ho.ndle foreign relations, has done a great
job. As I said the other day. the situation is similar to that or the man who
has an orne-ry jackass. He can talk to
him and talk to him. but he h~.d better
not gt't too clo~c to him, or he may be
kiCkt'd.
The Secretary of State and his assistants have worked d1hcrnt1y at this problem; and because they cannot cct the
Jackass to agree, they arc to blame.
That is the sort of Implication which
I do not like to have go out to the country. I want the country definitely to
understand my figure of speech.
We arc continually In the midst of a
pohtlcal picture. I say, give credit where
credit is due. Later, as I conclude my
remarks, I shall have something to say
about the distinguished Secretary ot
State. He serve<! under Acheson. When
I 'tl.'as chairman o! the Committee on
Foreign Relations. I saw his work t
ob~ervcd his work as a servant or the
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Democratic Party. I ha\'e seen him serve
for 6 years under President Eisenhower.
I have seen him get acquainted with this
glo~. as was indicated by a distinguished columnist this morning, as no
other man In history has done. He
knows every neighborhood. He knows
all the peoples. He_.il:nows the problems.
He has dealt with them.
Because we could not get the divergent
Interests to agree, he Is to blame. That
Is what I am objecting to. Such an Implication is absolutely unfair. Undoubtedly It has had much to do with
sending Secretary DuiiPs to the hospital.
He Is only human.
My next point Is that the Senator from
Montana, In his speech, asks that not
only the West Germans, but the United
States, take a more flexible approach to
the problem of German and European
security. The S:mator from Montana
mentioned the Rapacki plan and the
Eden plan, and said we should explore
both of them. We not only explored the
Eden plan, but put It forward as ll. Western proposal at the Geneva Summit Conterence. We have constantly been conslderlns all kinds of possible European
security plans. We have agreed that we
mu.t keep an open mind on this subJect.
On the other hand, all' these plans
Involve a general withdrawal of Western
strength from Western Europe; and we
must be careful not to engage In too
much loose talk about the seeming retreat type of pollcy unless we have rea&on to bleleve that the Soviets are disposed to Initiate a pullback toward their
borders. As the Senator from Montana
stated a few minutes ago, they would
get out of East Berlin; but they would
be on the line where troops would be
ready to march In and take over West
Berlin.
Our people are not blind. They recognize the fact that they are dealing with
some of ~he most efficient-if T mi~ht
call tl:em that-International M:.chlavelllnns In history. In doing so they are
going to protect the Interests of the West
and or America.
we agree that we must k~p ;:..n open
mind on this subject. On the other
hand. all these plans Involve a general
Withdrawal of Western strength from
Western Europe and we must be careful
that we do not en~tae:e In too much loose
talk about this seemingly retreat-type
o! policy unle!\5 we have reason to believe
that the sov1ets are disposed to initiate
n simultaneous pullback of the1r forces
toward their borders. Nothinr: in the
prese-nt situation cives us hope that the
Soviets are. In fact. willing to carry out
n mt'aotng!ul pullback of thc1r forces.
Too much general talk rcgardmg neutral
zones In withdrawal or thinning ..at of
our forces at th1s time. therefore. ..:ould
r,ive the Impression of softness on our
part and weakening of our resolve to
stand firm in this situation.
Finally, the distinguished Senator
!rom Montana sa) that standing firm in
Berlin Is a slogan and not a policy.
The fact ts that standing firm is the
bedrock of our policy. It ts quite true
that. having taken this decision. the
problem o! how we implement the stand
Jn the face of the many variations in
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which the threat can actually present
itself to us must be worked out. That is
exactnr what the executive branch has
been exploring ever since the crisis developed and It was the primary reason
that Secretary Dulles undertook his recent trip. we and our all1es, are all
aware that we must not only be agr~ed
on the fundamental concept of standmg
firm· but that we must also be agreed on
the details of implementing this policy.
It was to help work out a common agreement on these details that the Secretary
undertook this trip to London, Paris, and·
Bonn.
~
M
In other words, the senator .ron). ontana knows very well that the executive
branch here, as well as the governments
of our allies, knows that we must agree
on the detailed Implementation of the
policy In that we are all working now to
·get agreement on these details.
When we do get agreements, what
good are they? What does experience
teach us. Fifty out of 52 agreements
were not worth the paper they were
written on. The Kaiser said something
like that before. He spoke about a
treaty being a scrap of paper. We are
dealing with' a people whose philosophy
and morality in connection with international a.tralrs Is very low.
My overall reaetion to the speech of
the Senator !rom Montana, however, Is
that It is a great deal more reasonable
than many one has to listen to, an,ti
there are a number of sections, as I have
Indicated, in the speech which make
pretty good sense.
I do want to make very clear that, as
the distinguished Senator has said, when
the Executive Is "In the saddle" and has
the responsibility to deal with crises, and
that because the solution which one has
hoped !or Is not forthcoming, that that
is no reason to criticize the executive
branch of our Government. The Executive has had to deal with the representatives of the Kremlin for many years.
our past experience, as I Indicated,
shows what agreements with the Kremlin are worth.
I want to make It clear also. that In
my humble opinlon, the executive department has done everything that It
can do to bring about a settlement of
the German Issue. as well as a settlement on the wider scale of world tensions, of which the Kremlin is the source.
In my opinion the Berlin crisis in connection with the May date is IX).erely another Indication· of what we have had
in the past, particularly some months
ago In Formosa. It Is the purpose of the
Kremlin to get our attention on one point
on this little globe, and then do Its nefarious work at another point. The executive department Is keeping Its eye on
the whole show, so to speak, not merely
on the Kremlin, and It recognizes that
this Is just a part of the world-dominatIng Influence and philosophy of the
Kremlin.
Mr. President, when I heard the other
evening that John Foster Dulles had gone
to the hospital once again, I Issued a
release, and I shall read that release at
this point. I said:

John Foster Dullea. Countleaa thousands
will pray tor hls recovery.
When I think ot him, Burke's definition
ot a statesman comes to my mind: He possessed "e. <Usposltlon to preserve, e.n a bility
to Improve."
He has always been "e. !rlend to t ruth;
In action talth!ul, and In honor clear: who
broke no promises, served no private end."
These words ot Pope characterize this great
publlc servant.
Let us hope that during hla convl1.1escence
the carping voices wUI cease.
In my opinion no American In the last
50 years has given ot hlmsel! more un.stlntlngly and dedicated hlmsel! more to preserve
American than Foster Dulles. When others
threw br icks at him, he smiled and kept on
working tor the general wel!are. No man
In American history has become so well acquainted with this now neighborhood world
and Ita problema.
So we join with the countlesa thousands
who wish htm e. speedy recovery. His coun.
try needs him.

As the President and Walter Lippmann
have said, the country needs him.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator yield?
Mr. WILEY. I am happy to yield to
the Senator from PennsylvanJa.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have
listened with a great deal of Interest to
the ex~emely able address by my good
friend from Wisconsin In defense of
the State Department.
Mr. WILEY. I thank the Senator.
Mr. CLARK. I should !Ike to ask my
good friend this question. Earlier in his
remarks he ofiered for the RECORD the
column written by Walter Lippmann
published In the Washington Post this
mornJng. My question is whether he
agrees with that column.
Mr. WILEY. I took the column from
the paper, and the part 'that I read I
agreed with. However, I shall have to go
over It very closely, because the Implication is that I am not aware of something in the article. I have not read It
closely, because I have been waiting for
the Senator from Montana to conclude
his remarks, so tl'iat I may obtain the
floor.
Mr. CLARK. I would be happy to
have my good friend review Mr. Lippmann's column, which I personally believe is a sound one, )>ut which, It seems
to me, Is rather Inconsistent with the
point of view which my friend from Wisconsin has been so ably expounding.
I should like to call to his attention
the parts of the column I have In mind,
and I should like to ask him whether he
agrees that the principal point Mr. Lippmann makes is that the Russians are
frightened by the situation In eastern
Europe and that they fear an explosion
or revolution, and that such an explosion or revolution might require them to
repeat what they did In Hun'gary; that
If they did It in Eastern Germany what
they did In Hungary It would bring
about the great danger of starting
world war Ill, because we would be unlikely to permit East Germany to go
down the drain the way we let Hungary
go. Mr. Lippmann suggests that the
problem Is how we can prevent a revolution In a sa.telllte country and how we
can maintain a situation In which the
All Americana and many In tar ot! Ianda Russians can get .out of satellite counheard with sorrow o! the hoaplte.llzatlon ot tries and the satellite countries can re-
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main neutral and Berlin and Germany
can still be free.
I suspect that what Mr. Lippmann
says makes good sense and is pretty
much the essence of the brilliant address made by the Senator from Montana, with his nJne points that he urges
upon the administration in that address.
I do hope that the Senator from Wisconsin will take anQther look at the
Walter Lippmann column, and I hope
to find that he Is In agreement with lt.
Mr. WILEY. I shall be happy to read
it again very closely, because I am always Interested In that the statesman
Llppmann-and I would call him thathas to say.
When he speaks about the ferment
in Europe, that is only a part of the
story. There 1s no question that there
Is a ferment all over the world. One
of the problems which is confusing the
Russians and giving them much trouble
at present, as the Senator probably
knows, Is the attitude of the Chinese.
There are 650 million Chinese who may
be "on the go." All these matters have
had the consideration of the Department of State. The Committee on Foreign Relations has had this testimony
before it.
Willy Brandt, the Mayor of West Berlin, was asked the other day whether
the people in Poland, RumanJa, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States had falle.n
asleep and were satisfied with the1r
rulers. The answer, In his judgment,
was, "No". Of course, that gives trouble
to the Kremlin. That is a part of the
Russian problem.
Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, will the
Senator fut'ther yield?
Mr. WILEY. I yield.
Mr. CLARK. I have no Intention of
attempting to engage In a debate concernJng whether the action of the State
Department In the past has been right
or wrong. I think the Senator from
Montana [Mr. MANSFIELD] was very wise,
indeed, in avoiding that pitfall, which
It would be so easy to fall Into.
I suggest to the Senator from Wisconsin that we cannot solve this problem In the Interest of peace and freedom
merely by saying over and over again
that the Russians have broken 50 out of
52 agreements, and that therefore it
does not do any good to talk to them.
I suggest that we must talk an~ ta~k
and live with them, or else we wtll d1e
with them.
There are such things as self-executIng agreements, particularly with respect
to the withdrawal of forces. which are
enfoz:cible. and this regardless of the
efiect of the written word. It has been
my feeling that to have a more flexible
policy toward negotiation is highly
desirable.
I think the Senator from Montana
has rendered a distinct service, because
In many ways he Is sending word to
the State Department and to the country that. at least so far as a majority
of the U.S. Senate is concerned, we are
ready right now to negotiate a meaningful agreement.
We do not dismiss from our minds
plans which were ridiculed when they
were first brought forward 2 years ago

•
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by Mr. K ennan. Mr. Galtsklll, and Mr.
Rapackl, and others. We will talk about
anything In· the Interest of getting a
workable agreement toward peace. We
are not afraid to negotiate. We do not
trust the Ru~slans any more than some
of our friends In the State Department
do. But that Is no reason for not sitting
down at the table and talking with
them.
Mr. WILEY. Again, the Senator from
Pennsyl\•anla has made an Implied attack on the other branch of the Government.
The Senator talks about fiexlblllty.
Why docs he not talk about flexibility
with the people who are most concerned
with It, Instead of making a general
statement? That Is the point I am makIng. When I tried lawsuits. I tried to
anlve at conclusions on the !nets. not
on Implications. not on rumors. That
was my only point In raising this particular Issue.
'rhe Senator refers to the breaking
by the Russians of 50 out of 52 agreements. Let me tell the Senntor that It
was In the days before Pearl Harbor that
this Chamber was asleep; the President
was asleep; the people were asleep; the
Army, the Navy, &nd the Air Force were
asleep. They said It could not happen.
It did. That was the only reason I referred to the breakm~ by the Russians
of 50 out of 52 a11recments. I do not
want to ha\·c this country go to sleep on
the generality that it is possible to deal
with a skunk or someone \\hO docs not
keep f:uth.
Mr. CLARK. I think \\hat the Senator from Wtscon•ln has said nnd \1 hat
I have said \\Ill appear acclll ately m the
RECORD, as our good h lends, the Offic1al
Reporters. \\UI 1111te 1t out. I have no
intention of cngagm!lln furthl'r colloquy,
other U1an to say that I tmpltcd nothing.
It. was not I who spoke of the bteakmg
of 50 out of 52 agt c<·llll't1ls: lt was my
good fri<•nd. the S<'nator from \\'! <consin, who dtd so. I am contend to il't the
RECORD stand as tt "ill appear m pnnt
tomorrow mornmg.
Mr. WILEY. I ngr<'e that I made the
statl'ment. I did so for the Simple rcason that men !Ike the Scnator from Pcnnb:Vivama were h<'re at the tune of Pearl
Harbor and had s:ud tt could not happen. I do not 11 ant the brcakmg of 50
out of 52 agreements to be forcottcn by
the S<'nator from Pennsyh ant a <'ltlwr.
l\!r CLAHK. At the tunc of Pearl
Harbor. I" as In the un1fonn of my country, and not on the tloot of the Senate.
l\Ir WILhY. Oh, )I.'S. But other SC'n!ltoi S were talking as the &nator from
Penns)l\anla Is now spcnkmc. 'fhat :s
the only point I am makmg.
::\tr. Pre~idcnt, I yield the floor.
l\1r . LAUSCIIE. Mt• Pit' !dent, nt the
ve1y be ltllllll , I commend the ~enator
from ~.lontnna !or th,. study v.hich he
has r.tn·n to the prob!cm he dlscu •<'d
today. Spenkin for myself. I v.at.t the
So\ let Union to know thnt th<' Scnnto1 s
of the United Stntes ate Intently desirous of obtalnmg peace for the people
of the world. Whtle I may ~<'e some
dtffic ullies m carrymg out the plans surgc:.tcd hy the s~nator from !\fontana,
and projcctm:; thcm.elves over Ius talk.

I see a fervent purpose and desire to
bring about peace In the world. That Is
the light In which I wish the people of
Europe and the people of the world would
understand the Intention and the purpose of the u.s. Senate today.
What are some of the weaknesses
which I see In the proposal made by the
Senator from Montana? The Soviet
says: "We will withdraw !rom East Berlin." The question Is, how far will they
withdraw? In what posture will they
be after they have wlthdra\}'n? In what
position would we be If we withdrew !rom
West Berlin and moved a. distance o!,
say, 120 miles to the west?
My query would be: Based upon the
past conduct of the Soviet Union, could
we rely upon their word that they have
withdrawn and would stay withdrawn?
Or would there be the necessity o! negotl:~tlng In a manner which would preclude the possibility of their abandonJng
their word and movlng Immediately back
Into the area out of which they came I!
conditions devj!loped which were unsatisfactory
Second. for the people of West Berlin
and East B~rlln to negotiate would be
~imple. I think It Is generally agreed
that 95 percent of them would subscribe
to the philosophy of the West and would
rep'-!diate that of the East. If there
were a umfi~:ttlon of the government of
West Berlm and the government of the
Sovtet and communism In East Berlin,
m}' query Is: \\'hat type of government
would result? I cannot !01 get\\ hat happened In China when a coalition government \\·as formed I cannot forget \\hat
happened m YugoslaVIa when a coalition
government \\OS formed, and Mlkhallo' 1ch. the spirit of the ficht for freedom,
was scutll('d. The result of IJ mt coalition go\·ernment was that the Comm unists took control.
Nor can I forcet what happened In
Poland when the l'ov1ct Union proposed
a coalition go\ernment. The coalition
covernment "as created, the Red
troops were there. they took control nnd
rave orders. and soon the government of
Poland became a Communist government.
But in this situation there Is one gle:un
of light wh1ch woulcl cause me to analyze
the East Berlin and the West Berlin Situation in the belief that It miGht be
distingutshcd from the Yucoslavta bttuatton. the Chma Situation, and the
Poland sltuatton. In China, the Sov1ct
troops were In the northern part of that
country, and they dictated what \\liS to
happen. A similar situation existed m
Poland. In Yugoslavta, the word "hlch
came from Bntaln and from the Unite<!
Stntes was th:n l\llha!lo1 tch should be
abandoned and 1: tto should be accept('d,
What would happen m East Berlin and
In West Berlln tf those governments
combmed and tf the Sonct would st11y
back? In all the other countt ies I have
mentioned, condittons \H're h·1 tile for
the overthrow of those \1 ho 11 anted fn·cdom and for the mstallnllOn of those
who wanted dtctatorshlp. But that condition would not prentil In Germany.
A'> we have said, in Germany 95 p<·rct•nt
of th::! people would stand by the r,OI'Crll ·
;ncnts of the free Wl·:.t.
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But despite my belief that these
dangers are connected with the suggestions which have been made by the Senator from Montana, I believe It Is the
responsibility of the executive branch of
our Government and of this legislative
branch to explore every means of reaching an agreement, restricted only by the
proposition that we maintain our honor
and that we do not fall Into a pit which
would leave us weaker, after we negotiated, than we were before we began
to negotiate.
Mr. President, I yield the floor.

